Mali, one of West Africa’s landlocked countries, has been facing a fuel shortage since September. Because electricity production in the country relies on oil-powered thermal plants, the lack of fuel oil has shut these plants down. As a result, the capital Bamako is plunged into darkness, daily life grinds to a halt, schools are closed, and queues stretching hundreds of meters form at petrol stations. The cause of this crisis is the recent expansion of a jihadist terrorist group—active for years in the country’s north—toward the south and west, where it has begun targeting tankers transporting fuel from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire to Bamako. Images of hundreds of destroyed trucks burned along both major highways demonstrate that transportation security and freedom of movement in Mali have effectively ended.
Let us recall that Colonel Assimi Goïta overthrew the government of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) five years ago, citing widespread corruption and the government’s failure to combat jihadist and separatist groups. Under these circumstances, it is clear that Goïta and the junta under his command have utterly failed in the fight against terrorism.
Every Kind of Jihadist Organization Has a Presence in Africa
When discussing jihadist-related security problems in Africa, we first think of the Al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates operating in the Sahel. Beyond these, Boko Haram—which emerged in Nigeria in 2009—continues to make headlines by kidnapping schoolgirls in rural regions. In recent years, the ISIS-linked ISWAP threat has also grown in this populous country. On Africa’s eastern coast, the pro-sharia Al-Shabab organization has sustained Somalia’s intractable 20-year security crisis. In Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, the presence of ISIS-affiliated jihadist groups has been reported for the past eight years. We also know that jihadist organizations in Nigeria have launched attacks into neighboring countries through the Lake Chad region, especially targeting Chadian security forces.
Roots of the Sahel’s Jihadist Groups Trace Back to Algeria’s Civil War
The security problems of Sahel states extend back to the 1990s. Smuggling networks in the region’s remote and ungoverned areas have existed for decades. In the early 1990s, jihadist factions fleeing Algerian security forces (GSPC, FIS, etc.) were forced to leave the country and took refuge in the Sahel. Thanks to the security vacuum created by the region’s harsh geography, they preserved their presence and expanded their numbers with recruits from longstanding local communities (Tuaregs, Bambaras, etc.). In 2006, they pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and became known as AQIM. Over the years, they kidnapped numerous Western nationals, securing large ransom payments and growing in visibility.
Last September, we read in the press that the group now plaguing Mali—JNIM—broke the all-time ransom record by kidnapping a retired Emirati general (from Dubai’s ruling Al Maktoum family) who had come to Mali for gold mining/trade, along with two aides. Through this operation, the group reportedly obtained 50 million dollars in cash and 20 million dollars’ worth of weapons, significantly boosting its strength.
AQIM in 2006 Evolved into JNIM in 2017
This is the group that, after emerging as AQIM in 2006 and expanding over the years through new mergers and recruits, transformed into JNIM in 2017 (known in Europe as GSIM—Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims).
It is led by the widely-known Tuareg Malian figure Iyad Ag Ghali, founder of Ansar Dine. The organization’s second-in-command is Amadou Koufa, a Peul Malian and founder of Katiba Macina, long targeted by Western intelligence services.
JNIM currently maintains dominance in rural areas of northern, eastern, and central Mali, and its expansion has not been halted. In areas where public services do not reach and the army cannot protect civilians, JNIM effectively replaces the state, collecting “zakat”—in practice, extortion—often seizing one out of every 30 livestock. Villages refusing to submit are emptied; vulnerable residents flee to Mauritania or Côte d’Ivoire.
Jihadists Are Trying to Suffocate Bamako
Will JNIM succeed in suffocating the capital by burning fuel tankers? Can it topple the junta?
The answer: It may weaken the military government, but it cannot overthrow it. With 5,000–8,000 fighters, JNIM will not attempt a direct assault on Mali’s 40,000-strong army, which has aircraft and drones. JNIM’s goal is to wear down the Goïta administration in the medium term and create conditions conducive to a popular uprising against the junta.
So far, no significant anti-government protests have taken place in Bamako’s streets or squares. What will happen next is unclear.
However, recalling that the military seized power in 2020 following major anti-IBK protests led by influential religious figure Imam Dicko, one must accept that if the fuel crisis continues, nothing guarantees that people will stay off the streets. The junta’s heavy pressure on political opposition, combined with Bamako’s regional and global isolation, could merge with public dissatisfaction and lead to any number of outcomes.
You Cannot Save a Country from Terrorism with Foreign Troops
The crisis of autumn 2025 reminds us of events in 2012–2013. After the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, security challenges in the Sahel reached extreme levels. Jihadist and separatist uprisings that began in northern Mali could not be stopped, and these groups were close to seizing the entire country—until French military intervention preserved Mali’s territorial integrity.
The French halted the militants’ advance and forced them to withdraw but could not eliminate them entirely. Subsequently, in addition to French forces, the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA was deployed in 2013, and in 2018 the 5,000-strong G5 Sahel force—formed by five Sahel states—became operational.
Despite this international coalition totaling more than 20,000 personnel, jihadist and separatist groups could not be neutralized—an issue worthy of a separate detailed analysis.
In the years following the coup, Colonel Goïta expelled French forces and the international mission (2023), claiming they were ineffective, turning Mali away from the Western world and beginning a period of cooperation with Russia’s Wagner Group.
A Simple Question: Which of Mali’s Problems Has the Military Government Solved?
Five years have passed since the coup. The junta has solved none of Mali’s major problems, especially in the field of security. Their promise to hold elections within 2–3 years has been shelved. They have banned opposition parties and civil society organizations. They have continued to challenge ECOWAS and the African Union, both of which suspended Mali’s membership. By withdrawing from ECOWAS together with Burkina Faso and Niger, they have further weakened regional cooperation. Relations with Algeria—a respected neighbor of Sahel states—have collapsed. Economic indicators also show no improvement. In short, Colonel Goïta and the junta have remedied none of Mali’s ailments; instead, they have isolated the country regionally and globally. Apart from the recapture of the strategic eastern city of Kidal last year, there is no meaningful military success to point to. It has become evident that Russia’s Africa Corps, which replaced Wagner, cannot change the dynamics on the ground nor save the junta.
The Only Way Out Is a Political Solution: Dialogue with JNIM Is Essential
Given this negative background and a junta clinging to power, can Mali find a way out? The answer is definitively no. Two points are crucial:
- The fact that jihadist and separatist forces have not been defeated in 20 years—despite support from UN peacekeepers, Western militaries, Sahelian armies, and Russia’s Wagner—must be acknowledged.
- Dialogue with Iyad Ag Ghali must begin; negotiations must take place. If necessary, the mediation of Imam Dicko—currently residing in Algeria—should be sought.
At this stage, Iyad Ag Ghali is unlikely to insist on establishing a Taliban-style system in Mali. Has not former ISIS commander Golani reinvented himself as a leader attempting to present an inclusive administration in Syria? Was he not later hosted at the White House under the name Ahmed Shar’a by President Trump?
From where I stand in Ankara, a new constitutional framework—one far removed from the absurd notion of an “Islamic Republic of Mali” and not excluding the Tuaregs—could indeed be negotiated. Such an agreement could be submitted for popular approval through a dual-ballot referendum; elections could then be held; the electorate would decide whether the boycott of the West should continue or end; the military would return to their barracks; democracy, currently suspended, would be restored; Mali’s isolation would end; and relations with the African Union and ECOWAS could be normalized.
