Türkiye’s Strategic Depth: Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and the Shifting Regional Balance

Guest Writer Cengiz K. Fırat (R) Ambassador

For centuries, Türkiye’s geography has been both a blessing and a curse. Straddling Europe and Asia, controlling access to the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, and bordering some of the most volatile regions in the world, Türkiye is permanently at the center of regional and global rivalries. For Turks, threat assessment is not an abstract academic exercise—it is a lived reality, shaped by history, geography, ideology, and the ambitions of external powers.

Neighbors and Regional Tensions

To the south, Syria and Iraq continue to be the source of Türkiye’s gravest immediate security threats. The PKK and its Syrian offshoots, the YPG and SDF, have built up quasi-state structures along Türkiye’s border with US and Western support. Despite being NATO allies, American military and financial aid to these groups—whom Ankara regards as terrorists—creates profound mistrust. Meanwhile, instability in Iraq allows the PKK to operate with relative ease in the Qandil mountains, sustaining a four-decade-long insurgency.

To the west, although an ally in NATO, Greece remains a decades-long problematic neighbor. Rooted in overlapping histories of war, rivalry, and mistrust, tensions now revolve around territorial disputes in the Aegean, maritime boundaries, airspace violations, and hydrocarbon exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet the picture has sharpened in recent years. Athens is undertaking one of the most ambitious military modernization programs in its history, spending tens of billions of euros on advanced systems from the US, France, and Israel. These include French Rafale fighter jets, upgraded F-16s and F-35s from the US, Belharra frigates, drones, and a range of Israeli missile and electronic warfare technologies. At the same time, the US has expanded its military presence in Greece, now operating at least nine bases including Alexandroupolis, Larissa, Souda Bay, and Stefanovikio. For many in Türkiye, this buildup—combined with Washington’s close alignment with Greece and “Cyprus”—looks less like partnership and more like a deliberate encirclement.

Cyprus, meanwhile, remains a frozen conflict but is increasingly militarized. The Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) has become a hub of US and Israeli military cooperation, receiving arms deliveries and strengthening its strategic position against Türkiye.

The Black Sea and Ukraine

The war in Ukraine has reshaped the Black Sea balance. Russia’s aggression has turned the region into a militarized arena, undermining Türkiye’s ability to manage stability through the Montreux Convention. Turkish support for Ukraine, from drones to diplomacy, has drawn Russian ire, while the fate of the Crimean Tatars—historically tied to Türkiye—remains a national concern. Moscow’s occupation of Crimea is seen in Ankara not only as a violation of international law but also as a direct challenge to the Turkic-Muslim population with whom Türkiye has deep cultural and historical ties.

Iran and Sectarian Rivalry

Iran represents another layer of competition. Although Türkiye and Iran have not clashed directly since the 1639 Treaty of Kasr-ı Şirin, their rivalry continues through sectarian and geopolitical lenses. One is predominantly Sunni, the other predominantly Shia; one favors Turkic and Sunni Arab networks, the other cultivates Shia militias and alliances across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. From the Syrian battlefield to influence in the South Caucasus, Türkiye and Iran often face off through proxies, each seeking regional dominance.

Major Powers and Global Rivalries

The United States, Türkiye’s NATO ally and security anchor to date presents a paradox. On one hand, the alliance offers a framework for defense cooperation. On the other, Washington has consistently undermined Türkiye’s security interests by backing Kurdish groups in Syria, imposing sanctions over defense procurement, and supporting energy and transport corridors that bypass Türkiye.

The most high-profile of these is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Even though the project faces enormous logistical and political challenges under current circumstances—stretching from India through the Gulf, Israel, and into Europe—it is nevertheless out there as a strategic idea backed by Washington. Its very existence signals an effort to bypass Türkiye’s natural geographic role as the central land bridge between East and West. Ankara, for its part, is doubling down on its Middle Corridor project—linking China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye—and the Iraq Development Road project, a 1,200 km transport and energy corridor connecting Basra to the Turkish border. Both aim to secure Türkiye’s role as the indispensable hub in Eurasian connectivity.

Russia, historically both adversary and partner, represents a dual challenge. While Ankara cooperates with Moscow on energy (TurkStream, Akkuyu nuclear power plant) and regional crises, the two countries remain rivals in Syria, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea. Memories of centuries of Russo-Turkish wars continue to shape Turkish strategic thinking.

Although Türkiye has many friends within the EU, the final strategic decisions taken by the European Council are usually to the detriment of relations. The bloc tends to side with its member states’ positions—most often Greece and the Greek Cypriots—rather than adopt what might be more logical and balanced foreign policy decisions. The EU has also sought to exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Black Sea and the Caucasus, favoring routes from Georgia through Romania and Bulgaria. These decisions reinforce the Turkish perception of European hostility and undermine the broader EU–Türkiye partnership.

France and the UK both maintain deep historical ties with the Eastern Mediterranean. Paris, in particular, has strengthened defense ties with Greece and Cyprus, while London’s presence on Cyprus through its sovereign bases ensures that Britain retains a direct hand in regional affairs. Germany, home to a large Turkish diaspora, is often seen as a complicated partner—economically essential but politically unsympathetic, especially on Greek and Cypriot issues.

Israel: A Rising Threat

Relations with Israel have deteriorated to a new low. For Turks, Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza is seen as genocide against the Palestinian people, compounded by its relentless actions in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Its unending disregard for international law—striking other states, civil society groups, and even individuals abroad—has elevated the perception of Israel from a competitor to a direct threat. Coupled with Israeli military cooperation with Cyprus and Greece, and openly hostile rhetoric from Israeli officials about the need to confront Türkiye militarily, Ankara now views Israel less as a fluctuating partner and more as an adversary. This shift marks a fundamental change in how the two countries see one another, pushing the Israel threat to the top of Türkiye’s security agenda.

NATO and Turkish Skepticism

From a purely institutional and political-diplomatic perspective, NATO provides deterrence and a solid alliance. But from a populist perspective, Turks feel little comfort. The alliance has not prevented arms deliveries to the Greek Cypriots from NATO member states, nor has it stopped US support for PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups in Syria. In public opinion, NATO is not seen as a shield for Türkiye’s interests but rather as a structure that serves others first. Decision makers know that if a crisis erupts, Turkish expectations of NATO solidarity are met with skepticism at best.

The Self-Critique: Türkiye’s Foreign Policy Choices

Although the environment in which Türkiye operates is undeniably harsh—one that demands readiness for every eventuality without expecting any help from allies or alliances—it is also true that Türkiye could have made, and should still make, better foreign policy moves.

Consolidating allies would have been useful under current circumstances. Instead, policies have often complicated matters. The F-35/S-400 debacle with the US and NATO alienated key partners. Relations with the EU have deteriorated, leaving Türkiye adrift from what was once a strategic anchor. The governing coalition has sought to balance Türkiye’s place in the West (NATO, CoE, OECD membership, the EU accession process) with rhetoric about joining BRICS, deepening ties with Russia and China, and oscillating “one day hot, one day cold” relations with neighbors depending on political winds. Overt declarations of military support to Azerbaijan and Pakistan, while emotionally resonant domestically, have added to the perception of Türkiye as a partisan power. This has, in turn, built up a list of countries unhappy with Turkish foreign policy—including India, which now tilts toward Greece and Cyprus in part due to Ankara’s close embrace of Pakistan. These choices have contributed to the reality that Türkiye often finds itself fending off for itself, with fewer reliable partners than it might otherwise have had.

The Strategic Imperative

Surrounded by rivals, mistrustful allies, and volatile neighbors, Türkiye perceives itself as encircled by threats both near and far. Historical animosities, religious and ethnic divisions, territorial disputes, and competition for energy and transport corridors converge to create a uniquely challenging security environment.

Conclusion: Building Self-Reliance

For Türkiye in 2025 the lesson is clear: as the foreign policy being pursued often means a balancing act on a tight rope, alliances and partnerships are not strong enough to be depended upon. Only a robust, independent, and advanced defense industry can provide the tools necessary to address threats across the spectrum—from insurgency and terrorism to conventional warfare and regional rivalries.

Ankara has already made significant progress, developing indigenous drones, warships, and missile systems. But the pace must accelerate. Cyprus is becoming a heavily armed forward base for US and Israeli power. Greece is arming itself on a massive scale. Iran has a policy of expanding its reach through proxies. The EU continues to undermine Türkiye’s role as a natural corridor. The United States, while an ally, builds parallel structures that sideline Turkish interests. Israel now emerges as a top threat with its regional militarism and hostile posture toward Türkiye. Russia, although bogged down in Ukraine for the time being, will eventually turn its head back to Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus and Caspian Sea regions.

At the same time, as Türkiye’s foreign policy initiatives often clash with the interests of some of its neighbors and allies—not to mention rivals—it is only normal that a strong deterrence capability must be built. This deterrence must rest on a highly developed, self-sufficient military equipment industry. Developing such an arms industry is not simply a matter of pride or prestige—it is an existential necessity for survival in one of the most contested regions of the world.

Author’s Note: This article is written not through the lens of fine diplomacy or polite language but through the prism of realpolitik and the hardball political environment in which Türkiye finds itself. Decision makers are confronted with very fast-moving developments—wars, shifting alliances, tariff wars, energy crises—while also being pulled by local populist pressures at home. In such an atmosphere, Türkiye’s threat assessments reflect not idealism but survival instinct and the realities of power politics.

An uneasy truce, extended in instalments, holds in Gaza. Exchange of captives between the warring parties and humanitarian access to Gaza continue, with occasional hitches, under the terms mediated primarily by Qatar, and supported by the United States.

By simple arithmetic, the truce can be extended roughly for a fortnight (number of remaining Israeli hostages, including soldiers, divided by ten). Then, we may return to all-out war or something else.

This lull may have more in store. Let us proceed step by step.

The brutal rampage of 7 October 2023 will forever be a day of infamy in Israel. But its political repercussions were immediate. Israel at once abandoned its policy, in place since Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007. Israel concluded that reducing the question of Palestine to a security issue confined to Gaza, all the while devouring the West Bank, had come to a dead -and deadly- end. There could no more be Hamas in Gaza. The utility of this radical outfit for Israel was simply exhausted.

The Israeli Government’s objectives crystallized only in the process of war. They are eliminating Hamas (not realizable), returning all hostages (realizable), and ensuring that Gaza does not become a threat to Israel again (will take more than the war effort).

For the better part of the years with Gaza under Hamas’ control, Israel had both heightened security sensitivity, given the regionwide chaos following the Arab uprisings, and freedom to act as it pleased in the Occupied Territories, as the Arab regimes were all busy making their own existential stand. This was the ecosystem in which security defined politics in Israel, and Palestine was compartmentalized further.

If the Arab governments struck back at their dissenting people with vengeance after 2011, those people are now coming back with no less rage, exposing the utter failure of their regimes in ending Palestinian suffering. After the revolts and the ensuing bloodletting, the third round of the uprisings beckons. This is the deeper reason for the current restlessness of those governments.

On 7 October, Hamas made a strategic move, crushing its unwritten rules of engagement with Israel. Without a clear prior agreement with the wider, Iran-led axis of resistance to strike Israel in such game-changing fashion, Hamas found itself virtually alone on the battlefield. The U.S. warnings consolidated this outcome.

The United States, for its part, suddenly realized the greater dangers of toeing the Israeli line regarding Palestine. This put in jeopardy all its strategic investments as well as retrenchment in the region, including the normalization drive.

This led to an unprecedented flurry of high-level diplomacy, but perhaps more importantly, rendered the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza a central element of the war equation. This is what distinguishes the current Gaza war from all preceding ones, when civilian suffering was treated merely as a “saddening collateral”.

This is why we have the truce, however precarious, now.

Israeli bombardment was decidedly more ferocious and widespread, causing ever greater numbers of civilian casualties, and flattening entire neighborhoods, in preparation of a ground invasion. Vengeance factor aside, Israel also wanted to put pressure on all concerned parties to cooperate in minimizing these casualties either by pushing the Gazans to flee towards Egypt (which did not work until now) or by relocating the population within the strip, thereby creating a colossal humanitarian crisis.

And the tragedy is too big this time for Hamas to easily parry off its own responsibility in inviting such destruction.

Here is the calculus:

1. How much more time can Hamas buy? It may add new conditions for the release of captive Israeli soldiers, but Israel’s response will most probably be in the form of renewed military pressure.

2. Israel will have to tread a less fierce line in expanding its ground incursions into southern Gaza, because the area now shelters nearly all Gazans, and the U.S. has already told that aerial bombardment and shelling cannot continue as in the north. This means more focused and surgical ground operations, substantially increasing the vulnerability of the IDF members.

3. It is understood that half of Hamas militia have already suffered heavy losses. Isolated, it will be only a matter of weeks, if not days, before the remaining Hamas units in the north are totally neutralized. The regrouped and entrenched units in the south will be poised to make their last stand, but they too will be encumbered by the density of the civilian population.

4. Iran and its non-state allies do not have an existential stake in this fight, to the chagrin of Sunni Hamas. Sectarianism is sectarianism. Their never concretized red line may come close to keeping Hamas in Gaza, if in its emasculated condition. But regional spillover of the conflict will more likely be the result of an unintended escalation over the Israel-Lebanon border or some miscalculation. Otherwise, Iran would be averse to taking a strategic decision that will eventually put itself on target.

5. Meanwhile, the West Bank is resuming its central role for two reasons. Gaza distraction is over, and the West Bank revolt is simmering. Israel’s increased brutality there attests to its unease with the growing Palestinian resentment.

6. Enter the Arab public, who were simply overlooked by their governments and Western countries alike when they shaped their policies. Not this time.

7. Something’s got to give. A delicate equilibrium is taking form. Calls for a permanent ceasefire will grow louder now that the relief the truce has brought is overtaking the war-footing mood both in Israel and Palestine. This puts the Israeli government and Hamas in a tight spot. The political price of the war, apart from more death and destruction, will grow. The endgame of this conflict will not emerge on the battlefield. It will be on the political level. We shall be hearing more on the prospect of a two-state settlement. Whether the current Israeli leadership likes it or the Palestinian leadership can assume it will be a bit beside the point. This time, this war is becoming the dependent variable of the changing context, not the other way around. Whatever the post-war arrangements for Gaza will be, Hamas does not seem to have a future there. There is an emerging consensus in this direction in the Arab fold. This will also satisfy the concrete Israeli objective in this war. And Hamas will be left to content itself with its political role in the wider Palestinian framework. After all, it was Hamas which brought the question of Palestine back to international attention. In the haze of this partial success, the Hamas leadership in Gaza and its remaining fighters may be evacuated to a third country.