FROM AUTHORS
Namık Tan

Predictions for Türkiye-US Relations in 2025

6 January 2025
PAYLAŞ

In late 2024, the sudden collapse of the Assad regime caused excitement and anxiety not only in the country but throughout the Middle East. In this context, the slaughter in Gaza continued unabated. However, the most important event of the year was undoubtedly the election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States. Donald Trump’s return to the presidency will have significant effects on both world politics and Turkey-US relations. It is obvious that the policies that Trump will pursue in his second term will have a serious impact not only on the balance within the US but also on global relations.

Turkey’s role in this new era and the course of relations will be analyzed: Trump’s first presidential term was a period that questioned the durability of American democracy and the conventional patterns in international relations.

In particular, his foreign policy under the slogan of “America First” led the US to move away from the traditional multilateral diplomacy. This approach weakened the US’s global leadership role and led actors such as the European Union, China and Russia to take more independent steps. At the same time, however, it also led countries such as Saudi Arabia to rapprochement with Israel, focusing on the goal of withdrawing the US from wars and strengthening the US economy.

In Trump’s second term, these same trends are likely to strengthen. Of course, this is likely to have a profound impact on institutions such as NATO and strain European-US relations. Europe’s efforts to stand on its own two feet are already intensifying, while preparations have begun in Brussels for possible trade disputes with the US. These and other new developments in the geopolitical arena, such as Syria, could lead to a weakening or at least a transformation of transatlantic ties.

This transformation could enhance Turkey’s position within the Western alliance and its bargaining power in bilateral relations with the US. However, if the government mismanages this process, there is also the risk of a total disengagement.

In order to seize the opportunities arising from the US-EU rivalry, Turkey needs to pursue a balanced and multidimensional strategy. This strategy should include maintaining security cooperation with the US while maintaining its role in NATO and keeping economic and diplomatic channels open with the EU. However, pursuing the right policies alone is not enough. Our country has been wrong when it is right on many issues due to its inability to communicate its achievements on the ground.

This is true for the Armenian issue as well as our policies on Cyprus, Libya or Syria. If we can support the right policies in this critical period with a rational and professional communication strategy, we will be able to best pursue our interests both regionally and globally at a time when the transatlantic relationship is being reshaped.

In particular, Trump’s previous tough stance within NATO has been characterized by his demands for more financial contributions from European allies. These demands were criticized by some European leaders and called into question the US leadership role in the alliance. For NATO member states like Turkey, this poses both risks and opportunities. A reduced US leadership role in NATO should normally increase Turkey’s importance in the alliance.

However, NATO is not only a military alliance, but also an international structure that connects countries that share universal values in the field of defense. Therefore, Turkey needs to address its deficiencies in terms of democracy, rule of law and freedoms as soon as possible and manage this process more carefully as it takes steps to become an independent actor in its region. Otherwise, it may be ostracized by other NATO countries, as in the F35 process in which it has invested billions of dollars.

To prevent this, Turkey may need to assume more responsibility to strengthen its position within NATO in this second Trump era. In sum, Turkey needs to manage its efforts to strike the right balance with other actors in the alliance in order to maintain and strengthen its regional leadership position.

The war in Ukraine may be frozen by a ceasefire, if not by a peace agreement. This is also Russia’s expectation. Trump does not want to mess with Russia and align Russia and China.

In the Far East, the developments in Ukraine may give new dimensions to the issues of Taiwan and North Korea. It is difficult to make predictions now. First we need to see what will happen in Ukraine. If China gets too tight, it may resort to retaliation on the Korean peninsula, in the South China Sea and in Taiwan.

It is not difficult to foresee that the US will place strategic competition with China at the center of its foreign policy in Trump’s second term, as it did in his first. This may create both opportunities and challenges for regional actors such as Turkey. China’s acceleration of the Belt and Road Initiative may further complicate Turkey’s balancing act in economic relations.

Maintaining economic ties with China while strengthening its strategic partnership with the United States requires delicate diplomacy. For example, if the Chinese government decides to follow through on its threats over Taiwan, and does so while NATO is preoccupied with internal debates over Trump’s election and already busy with the war in Ukraine, this could force Turkey to take a clear stance on economic and security cooperation with the United States.

As is well known, one of the biggest crises in Turkey-US relations in recent years has been over Turkey’s purchase of S-400 air defense systems from Russia. This issue led to Turkey’s unilateral exclusion from the F-35 program and a serious breach of trust between the two countries.

However, Trump’s re-election as president may create an opportunity for a new dialog on this issue. Given that Trump is a pragmatic and results-oriented leader, there is a chance that the S-400 issue can be overcome with a solution in line with NATO standards. Likewise, Turkey’s return to the F-35 program could also be negotiated. Such steps could both revitalize military cooperation between the two countries and increase solidarity within NATO.
However, given the stance of the US Congress and other obstacles at the institutional level, we are again faced with the need for better communication.

Trump’s second term will also profoundly affect the balance in the Middle East, as we observed in the first term. In particular, given that Trump is now backed by a strong popular will against the system, it is not difficult to see the possibility of harsh sanctions against Iran and increased tensions in the region.

It is critical for Turkey to pursue a balanced foreign policy in this process. Maintaining its strategic partnership with the US while preserving its economic ties with Iran requires a very difficult diplomacy.

Meanwhile, while Trump’s willingness to withdraw from Syria seems to have created an opportunity for Turkey, we are already witnessing the intensification of views that this will not be easy to realize.

If the US ends its support for the YPG, perhaps Turkey will be able to move more freely in northern Syria, but taking this for granted now may lead us to a dead end. This is why we need to take a long-term and careful approach to these issues, rather than adopting absolute solutions.

However, such an approach also brings to the fore the strategic synergies between Turkey and the US. In other words, it should not be overlooked that there could be a strong strategic synergy between Turkey and the US stemming from the geopolitical competition between regional actors and global powers.

In Trump’s second term, developments in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular, offer opportunities to demonstrate the complementary capacities and experiences of the two countries.

For example, if Turkey’s soft power meets American resources in Africa in a productive way, we are more likely to win the competition against China in the African continent.

Turkey’s experience on the ground in different regions and its dynamic diplomatic network, coupled with US influence on a global scale, can produce concrete solutions to the quest for energy security, counterterrorism and economic stability.

If dialogue channels are kept open during this period and a long-term roadmap built on mutual interests is established, it may be possible to build a more stable future not only for Turkey and the US, but for all countries in the region.

Speaking of lobbying, we should not forget the importance of Israel-Turkey relations in recent years. Relations have been strained by the policies of the Netanyahu administration and the Turkish side’s exaggerated closeness to Hamas.

In particular, the humanitarian catastrophe of the Gaza crisis led to a hardening of Turkey’s stance. In such an environment, Trump’s unlimited support for Israel and Israel’s lobbying power in Washington could lead to new tensions in Turkish-American relations.

This equation could lead to Turkey being labeled as a Hamas supporter, despite the fact that Turkey’s humanitarian aid and diplomatic initiatives have been welcomed in the international arena. If Trump addresses these issues in a more balanced manner, a constructive era in Turkish-American relations can be opened, but if he prefers to take a populist stance, we will have a really difficult job.

Another equation is the exploitation of natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean in the context of Turkey’s recent advances in energy infrastructure. If Turkey can do so, it can make progress towards its goal of becoming a regional energy hub.

However, this process may be hampered by tensions in relations with Israel. If Turkey and Israel can reach a compromise on energy cooperation, this could bring great benefits to both countries, the region and the world economy.

Finally, Trump has a historic opportunity to bring about a lasting peace in the Middle East. However, in order to seize this opportunity, Trump needs to adopt a more inclusive and strategic approach.

If diplomatic solutions are prioritized over a hard power-oriented policy, this will serve the interests of not only the US but also Turkey. Trump’s success in this process could reshape not only the balance in the Middle East but also the global system.

All this suggests that Turkey-US relations will face both great opportunities and serious challenges in Trump’s second term.

In this process, Turkey’s full utilization of its potential as a regional power depends not only on the leaders but also on the proper functioning of diplomatic and institutional structures that truly embrace democracy, the rule of law and universal values.

* bu yazının Türkçe’den İngilizceye çevirisi AI ile yapılmıştır

YAZAR

Namık Tan

Ambassador (R). Served as Turkey’s ambassador in Tel Aviv and Washington. Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, chief of cabinet for the minister and deputy undersecretary for political affairs in the Foreign Ministry. He joined the Ministry in 1982. Worked in Turkish Embassies in Moscow, Abu Dhabi and trice in Washington.

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Turning Over a New Leaf in Relations with Israel

4 March 2022

There is a saying attributed to Vladimir Ilich Lenin: “There are decades where nothing happens, and there are weeks where decades happen”. This could not be more applicable to recent developments in global politics. Turkey’s recent rapprochement to Israel is a good example that fits this description.

 

The Government of Turkey seems to have realized that some of its erratic policies will come back to haunt them. Recent foreign policy initiatives indicate that Turkey is on a charm offensive to soften the blowback it expects from its past mistakes. In this spirit, the government seems to have abandoned earlier rhetoric that resonated well with its domestic political base but had little international policy value. As a result we are witnessing intense efforts to repair the bilateral relationship with regional adversaries. The recent visit to Turkey by the leader of the United Arab Emirates is meant to symbolize the fresh start Turkey is ambitious to achieve with others as well.

 

These efforts are awarded with a brand new foreign policy slogan. After the “Zero Problem” doctrine which ended up resembling “Zero Solutions”, the government now likes to refer to its foreign policy objectives as the “Problem-free Circle” representing its desire to create a circle of allies with regional countries.

 

Having finally realized that a foreign policy based on angry statements and unilateral actions achieves very little, Turkey’s government has dramatically changed its approach to Israel as well. This is perhaps the most concrete manifestation of the Government’s change in attitude.

 

These efforts have found a receptive audience in Tel Aviv as well as Israel also realized that it is better off enjoying good relations with Turkey. One cannot help but ask whether it was really necessary to force relations with Israel, a very important regional country, to a boiling point to begin with? Sadly the political leaders on both sides acted impulsively and did not calculate the potential cost of their negligent policies. And instead of assuming responsibility for certain mistakes and trying to find common ground based on mutual interest, both sides tried to leverage this bickering politically. Turkey supported Hamas to spite Israel and Israel felt entitled to murder 11 Turkish civilians during the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident. Such mistakes inevitably escalated the tension between the two countries.

 

How did it all start?

 

The beginning of the events that strained relations goes back to “Operation Cast Lead”. Israel initiated this military operation in December 2008 to quell Palestinian paramilitary groups in Gaza, but the military methods it used were heavily criticized internationally and became known in the Muslim world as the “Gaza Massacre”. Unfortunately, this operation was started only days after a meeting between the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and then Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan where Mr. Erdoğan advocated for a peaceful solution. Erdogan felt betrayed by Olmert who seemed to have left his table only to order a military operation that killed hundreds of Palestinians leaving Erdoğan in a difficult spot politically.

 

Shortly thereafter, in the first weeks of 2009, during a plenary session of the Davos Conference, Erdoğan ended up raising his voice to the late President of Israel, Shimon Peres, which became known as the “One-Minute” incident.

 

And finally, the Mavi Marmara Flotilla incident occurred in the spring of 2010 where 11 Turkish citizens were killed in international waters by Israeli special forces.

 

And beyond that point, it seemed impossible to get the relationship back on track again. Erdoğan perceived Olmert’s behavior as a personal slight to his person and hardened his approach to Israel, never forgiving Olmert for his failure to keep his promise to find a peaceful solution.

 

Turkey shifted gears and started putting its weight behind Palestinian authorities. In short, both sides took the relationship for granted, and created an environment that was detrimental for regional peace and stability.

 

While I sincerely hope Turkey’s efforts to rebuild the relationship will succeed, it is important to realize Israel has less to lose if these attempts fail. If we analyze recent attempts to build a circle of allies from the perspective of Turkish Israeli relations, it would be unrealistic to quickly expect a full normalization. We need to realize that we need this normalization more than that Israel does. Israel is doing much better economically and from a geostrategic angle has less need for Turkey than before. While Turkey used to be Israel’s only Muslim-majority ally in the region, the Abraham Accords have remedied this situation and Israel now enjoys other allies in the Sunni world rendering Turkey less valuable.

 

It is therefore important to manage expectations for the aftermath of the expected visit by Yitzak Herzog, the President of Israel. Following the visit, it will be necessary to execute a series of confidence-building measures to regain the trust of Israel’s political authorities as well as the Israeli public opinion.

 

While challenges remain, there are also good reasons to be optimistic. Perhaps most importantly, the simple fact that the economic relationship continued to prosper even during the years that the political relationship was frozen. The refusal of economic relations to be subservient to political relations should be seen as a major source of hope and Erdoğan’s statement that Turkey could carry Israeli gas to Europe could not be better timed even though it might prove difficult to finance such a pipeline. Similarly, the number of Israeli tourists visiting Turkey has substantially increased in recent years and the cultural angle of the relationship including sports events are also reasons to be optimistic.

 

Israel, Iran, Azerbaijan

 

Another reason that the bilateral relationship is proving more resilient than many analysts assumed until recently, it is the ability of Israeli decision-makers to think strategically. Israeli policy-makers are uniquely qualified in recognizing that Israel will also benefit, on the long-term, from better and stronger relations with Turkey. Both countries have a common interest in containing Iranian influence in the region especially with the latter taking an increasingly more aggressive approach in trying to wield power in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. Iranian efforts to increase its influence in Gulf countries such as the UAE as well as attempts to undermine stability in the relationship between Azerbaijan and Armenia, will further add to the importance of stronger Turkish Israeli relations.

 

Benefits of rapprochment in the West and the Hamas factor

 

I am also convinced that Israel is well aware of the fact that Turkey could assume a significant role in ensuring that the deep differences of opinion between Israel and Hamas do not lead to more violent conflicts between the two sides. In fact, everyone knows that Turkey was able to play such a role succesfully in the past. Therefore, if Turkey once again adopts a constructive attitude on this matter, it would have a very concrete and positive effect on rebuilding the relationship to its past glory. It is therefore no surprise that Turkey has made substantial efforts to distance itself from the Muslim Brotherhood as well as from armed factions of Hamas. Turkish policy makers should realize however that their Israeli counterparts will be monitoring closely whether such efforts enjoy real continuity.

 

It is also beyond any doubt that Western allies of both countries, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, will actively welcome more cooperation between Turkey and Israel. In fact, any measure of improvement in our relations with Israel, will inherently have a positive impact on our relations with these countries. This, in turn, will resonate positively on Turkey’s defense industry ambitions as well as other policy areas.

 

Israel also has a lot to gain

 

Israel should take care to rebuild relations with Turkey on a “win-win” basis to ensure its continuity and its leaders should look past transitional disagreements and remember longstanding amicable relations between the Turkish and the Jewish peoples. While few people in the West will recall, Turkey was the first majority-Muslim country to recognize Israel when it gained independence; a fact that will never be forgotten by the Israeli people.

 

In short, by adopting a pragmatic approach, Turkey managed to break the ice with the UAE. And it is now working to rebuild relations with Israel while considering options to reconcile with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Today’s political authorities are now realizing that rebuilding trust is much more difficult than destroying it.

 

Time for allies to be allies

 

While I am not entirely convinced that recent attempts to regain the trust that was lost in the last 15 years, are the result of deep introspection and a serious analysis of past mistakes, I remain hopeful that a convergence of interest between the two countries as well as the realization that enough challenges exist for both parties without constant bickering with old allies, will be enough to give these efforts continuity. It is past time to let bygones be bygones and look ahead while focusing on what unites us rather than fighting about our disagreements.


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Armenia’s Illegal Settlement Policy in the Karabakh and Formerly Seven Occupied Districts of Azerbaijan

9 August 2023

During the first Karabakh war of the early 1990s, Armenian forces not only won control over the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) but also occupied seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan, forcing up to 700,000 inhabitants to flee. The occupation of Azerbaijani lands prevented the establishment of diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Armenia, and after the occupation of Kalbajar in 1993, Türkiye closed its land borders with Armenia.

In 1993, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed four resolutions – 822, 853, 874, and 884 – demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces, but for 27 years these calls fell on deaf ears while U.S., French, and Russian diplomats attempted to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

Though the seven regions were expected to be returned in most of peace proposals put on the table before the sides, a policy to settle Armenians from Armenia and its Diaspora in those territories instead raised many doubts that that they would. Even in 2008, a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on “The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan”  emphasized the breach of international humanitarian law and the “the situation resulting from the occupation of the territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”

Between 30 January and 5 February 2005, a fact-finding mission conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) undertook a visit to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The mission’s primary achievement was the publication of a report that meticulously assessed the situation on the ground. The report’s significant finding was the identification of illegal Armenian settlers in the occupied territories, substantiated by concrete evidence gathered during the mission’s visit.

It should be remembered that the 6th paragraph of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention, also ratified by Armenia, clearly forbids an occupying power from deporting or transferring its own civilian population to the occupied territories.

Evidence of Illegal Settlement in the Occupied Territories

A 2016 report by Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry presents ample evidence of Armenia’s extensive alterations in the occupied territories. These changes encompassed various sectors such as energy, agriculture, social welfare, residential areas, and transportation infrastructure.[1]

Prioritizing infrastructure development in the occupied territories was explicitly aimed at attracting and retaining illegal Armenian settlers in those areas. Economic activities initiated by these settlers led to the encroachment upon land, natural resources, as well as public and private assets belonging to Azerbaijan and those Azerbaijanis forced to flee.

Regardless of its own demographic problems, the Armenian authorities encouraged people from the villages and cities of Armenia to live in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Technical, material and financial support for settlement projects in formerly occupied regions of Azerbaijan were financed from the budgets of various ministries of Armenia, including the then Ministry of Diaspora.

The main purpose of this policy was to preserve the status quo and create a fait accompli for the future negotiations, create a new demographic situation in the occupied lands, erase the historical and cultural heritage of Azerbaijan, and ultimately prevent Azerbaijan’s efforts to liberate the occupied territories and  return the Azerbaijani internally- displaced persons (IDPs)  to their homes. One example of this was the erasure of traces of Azerbaijanis in the occupied territories by changing their geographical names. According to the Institute of Geography of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences in 2013, 277 geographical names were changed.

Exploiting Nationalism and Social Vulnerability to Attract Settlers

In an attempt to appeal to nationalist emotions and thus attempt to encourage more Armenians to move to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, Armenia resorted to tactics such as replacing Azerbaijani toponyms with those possessing historical connotations for nationalist Armenians. For example, the name of the village of Jahangirbeyli in the Zangilan district of Azerbaijan was changed to Van after the occupation.

In November 2001, the separatist regime in the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan decided to establish the Department of Migration and Settlement, the main work of which was the implementation of the settlement policy. A ten-year program for 2001-2011 was developed. Under this program, it was planned to increase the population to 300,000 in the formerly occupied territories of Azerbaijan and former NKAO during the mentioned period.

Those who migrated from the cities and villages of Armenia to the occupied lands of Azerbaijan were mainly people in a poor financial situation. They were given land for agriculture and animals for farming, but it was also not easy for some of the people from the cities of Armenia to adapt to these conditions. Most had lived in urban centers all their lives and were not familiar or experienced with agriculture and animal husbandry.

The Serobyan family moved from Charentsavan, an Armenian town, to Kalbajar, the formerly occupied region of Azerbaijan, in 1999.  Their decision to move to Kalbajar was because of the difficult social conditions they faced in Armenia. During an interview in 2007, Roza Serobyan described the conditions they moved to, mentioning that conditions in Kelbajar, which Armenians had renamed Karvachar, were particularly difficult.[2]

While the Armenian government claimed its policy was to resettle Armenian refugees from Baku, Sumgait and other regions of Azerbaijan to the occupied regions of Azerbaijan, very few joined this settlement program.

“Not many came because they were used to their life in Baku and Sumgait. Many now feel safer in Armenia, and like a million other Armenians, some have left for Russia,” said Zoric Irkoyan who moved from Yerevan to Lachin in 1995 where he worked as a senior education specialist.[3]

Armenia and diaspora groups instead encouraged Armenians from Syria and Lebanon to settle in the occupied lands. Armenian parliamentarians for the Armenian Revolutionary Federation – Dashnaktsutyun, Vahan Hovhannesyan and Lilit Galstyan, launched an initiative called ‘Help Your Brother ‘ to raise funds for the settlement of Syrian Armenians in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

False Promises

Few, however, came to populate the occupied territories and those that did were not prepared for the difficult environment of destroyed villages and towns that they would discover. For example, the first illegal settlers from the Middle East to the occupied territories had already come from Lebanon and Syria in 1999. Numbering around 30 people, they were members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation  – Dashnakstutyun and settled them in the village of Meşediismayilli in the occupied Zangilan region. The name of the village was changed to Ditsmayri.

Even though the Armenian government and the separatist regime of Karabakh promised free electricity before the settlement, this did not happen. The electricity of these settlers, whose debts accumulated because of difficulty in paying, was cut off. One of those who settled in the village of Meshediismayilli was Nazareth Libaridian, a relative of Gerard Libaridian, the adviser to the former president of Armenia, Levon Ter Petrosyan.

Nazareth Libaridian moved to the village from Beirut in 1999 where he began to engage in grape growing and winemaking. In an interview with the Armenian media he spoke about how one night  the separatist regime officials cut off electricity in the village. The head of the village, Razmik Kurdian, had moved to Meshediismayilli from Lebanon.

This land was paid for in blood, and will only be given back with blood. If anyone ever thought of returning this land, they would be betraying the memory of those who died,” he said during one interview[4] in the early 2000s, but conditions became so unbearable in Meshediismayilli  that he left soon after. Due to accumulated debts and problems with roads and transport to and from the village, many illegal settlers from Lebanon and Syria also left.[5]

Exploiting Refugees

Armenia saw an opportunity for the settlement of Syrian Armenians, particularly in the  Lachin, Gubadli, Zangilan, Jabrail districts of Azerbaijan, due to their experience in agriculture. Armenia hoped that their expertise will play an important role for the successful colonization of these territories. In 2013, for example, there were 29 Syrian Armenian families in addition to many more settlers from Armenia living in the occupied Lachin and Zangilan regions of Azerbaijan and another 40 families were on a waiting list.[6]

In August 2020 the head of separatist regime of Karabakh, Arayik Harutyunyan, said that 11 Armenian families from Lebanon moved to the occupied regions of Azerbaijan. He also stated that this issue was discussed with the Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs  which was established on June 11, 2019, by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia.

Some of these families were given homes in Shusha.

This behavior by the Republic of Armenia and the separatist regime received a harsh reaction from political circles in Azerbaijan. Hikmet Hajiyev, the adviser to the President of Azerbaijan, described this action of Armenian government, which took place after the July 2020 border clashes, as a provocation by Armenia, adding that Armenia’s illegal settlement policy across Azerbaijan’s occupied territories was a military crime.

The groups that Armenia and the separatist regime in Karabakh used to settle the occupied areas were not only Syrian and Lebanese Armenians. In 2014, the so-called presidential spokesman of the separatist regime, Davit Babayan, said that Karabakh is ready to accept Iraqi Yazidis fleeing from ISIS:

“If there are such requests, we will see to what extent we are able grant them,” said Davit Babayan in an interview with Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty’s Armenia Service.[7] It does not appear that any took up the offer.

Faced with failure to sufficiently populate the seven formerly occupied regions, organizations in the Armenian diaspora also supported the illegal settlement. Although many villages in Armenia have been depopulated because of the adverse socio-economic conditions there, the Armenian authorities invested in the occupied regions of Azerbaijan. Such initiatives demonstrated how insincere Armenia had been during negotiations that assumed the return of those lands.

Diaspora Involvement In Illegal Settlement

Azerbaijan’s concerns were further heightened when more diaspora organizations engaged in such activities. The Hayastan All Armenian Fund, founded in 1992 in Yerevan, is perhaps the most well known of these organizations. Though comprising a Board of Trustees including the heads of the Armenian Church and the leadership of Armenia and the separatist regime in Karabakh[8], it sought to raise funds from the diaspora for projects in both in an annual telethon. Its activities in Karabakh and the occupied territories, however, were the most controversial.

In 1995, for example it had already funded the construction of what has become known as the Lachin Corridor connecting Armenia to Karabakh at the cost of over $72 million. The highway was completed in 1999 and two years later, in 2001, it started construction on another connecting occupied Aghdara through occupied Kalbajar to Vardenis in Armenia. The total cost of the project completed in 2017 was $35.4 million of which around half was provided from official sources. Then President Serzh Sargsyan attended the opening ceremony in Karabakh.[9]The total cost of the project was approximately $35.4 million, of which $15.6 million were provided by the Armenian government and about $4.1 million by the separatist regime in Karabakh. The North-South highway, which stretched from Aghdara to Hadrut and passed through Aghdam, clearly outside the boundaries of the NKAO, as was Kalbajar and Lachin, was built from 2000 to 2009 for $28.5 million.

The Hayastan All Armenian Fund also introduced water supply systems into areas such as Kalbajar in order to support the settlement of Armenians there. Naturally, when Azerbaijan took back its territories in the 2020 war, the Hayastan All Armenian Fund lost projects worth at least $100 million according to Armenian sources.[10] Others were to also lose their investments.

The Tufenkian foundation, founded in 1999 by American-Armenian buisnessman James Tufenkian, constructed houses in the occupied regions of Azerbaijan such as Lachin, Zangilan, and Jabrail from 2003, also attempting to settle people from Armenia, Syria, Lebanon there. It also funded local media and journalists in Armenia, sometimes clandestinely, to promote their activities in this area. In 2004, the Tufenkian Foundation started construction of a “model village” in the Jabrail region of Azerbaijan, investing $1.4 million  to build what they named Arajamugh.

The Armenian Youth Federation, the youth wing of the ARF-Dashnaktsutyun, also contributed financially to this project. AYF members from the U.S. visited the village and promoted it on through various diaspora media. In 2008, a conference was even held in Lachin sponsored by the separatist regime of Karabakh and the Tufenkian Foundation to develop a plan to populate the Lachin, Qubadli and Zangilan regions of Azerbaijan given unsuccessful efforts up until that point.

In 2019, James Tufenkian met with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan who welcomed his activities in Karabakh and the seven surrounding regions, clearly identifying that such efforts were not confined only to the previous regimes headed by Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan.

There were other organizations in the Diaspora too. Artsakh Roots Investment (ARI) was registered in Cyprus in 2010 and founded by Lebanese–Armenian businessmen, some of which were also members of ARF-Dashnakstutyun. ARI started to build new houses in the Zabukh village of Lachin in 2014. The opening ceremony of the village took place in September 2016 and Armenian families from Syria and Lebanon as well as Armenia moved to Zabukh, now renamed Aghavno.

One of those settlers was Andranik Chavushyan who moved from Syria to Armenia but then decided to live in Lachin in 2014. However, because of the difficult conditions there, he moved to the newly constructed Zabukh village in 2016. Chavushyan later became the ‘mayor of the Aghavno’  and partcipiated in the April 2016 War and the Second Karabakh War in 2020.

‘Our goal is to secure investments from the Diaspora to Nagorno Karabakh Republic for the purpose of economic development and resettlement,’ ARI’s Benyamin Bichakjian said.[11]

The second major project of ARI was the construction of the Sydney settlement in formerly occupied Kalbajar. Fifteen houses were built with the $500,000 investment of Lebanese-Armenians and Australian-Armenians in Kalbajar. The Armenian government invested $300,000 dollars to construct infrastructure. Zabukh was finally returned to Azerbaijan in August 2022 when the existing Lachin Corridor was re-routed as agreed in the November 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement.

Lessons not Learned

Despite that ceasefire statement, however, Armenian claims on territories won back or returned because of the 2020 war continue. Though Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan might be ready to recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, it does not appear as though the separatist regime in Karabakh is. On February 18, 2022, its parliament approved a bill that recognized all regions liberated during the Second Karabakh war were ‘occupied’ by Azerbaijan.

There also seems to be no recognition among the population of Armenia, nor in statements made by the Armenian government since 2020, that the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan was not only occupied and destroyed, but also illegally settled despite four UNSC resolutions. Failure to both acknowledge this or sign a peace agreement would only lead to even more concerns that Armenia had no intention of returning these lands.

The systematic destruction, illegal economic activities and illegal settlement policy carried out by Armenia in the occupied Azerbaijani territories for 30 years highlights how Armenia ignored international law by referring to the seven regions surrounding the former NKAO as ‘liberated.’ Moreover, this apparent policy of destruction and later settlement by Armenians after 1994 highlights how fears that the negotiation process prior to 2020 was imitation and simply a stalling process by Armenia only were not without substance.

[1] ILLEGAL ECONOMIC AND OTHER ACTIVITIES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF AZERBAIJAN

https://mfa.gov.az/files/shares/MFA%20Report%20on%20the%20occupied%20territories_March%202016.pdf

[2]  Возвращение в Арцах https://old.hayernaysor.am/ru/archives/125156

[3] Life In No Man’s Land  https://onnik-krikorian.com/new_site/life-in-no-mans-land/

[4] Life In No Man’s Land

https://onnik-krikorian.com/new_site/life-in-no-mans-land/

[5]Illusions and Reality: The vision of Ditsmayri  https://hetq.am/en/article/11131

[6] Kashatagh Governor: 29 Syrian Armenian families live here and another 40 are on wait list https://hetq.am/en/article/28835

[7]Karabakh ‘Ready’ Accept Yazidi Refugees  https://www.azatutyun.am/a/26539932.html

[8] [8] Hayastan All Armenian Fund https://georgia.mfa.am/en/hayastan-fund/

[9] https://anca.org/vardenis-martakert-highway-opens/

[10]Armenians Invested Millions in Artsakh; Much Is Now in Azerbaijani Hands https://hetq.am/en/article/126476

[11] Artsakh Roots Investment-ը ներդրումներ է ապահովվում ԼՂՀ-ի տնտեսական զարգացման համա https://hetq.am/hy/article/70482

@2024 – Ankara Politikalar Merkezi

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