Is Global War at the Door?
Recently, we have been witnessing the frequent circulation, both in social media channels and in official discourse, of the narrative that the Third World War has actually started or that we are on the verge of it.
When we consider the cyber and hybrid threats, which are among the most important challenges of our age and have transnational characteristics, it is an undeniable fact that they constitute the critical components of a globalscale war involving public and private spheres. Therefore, the phenomenon of an asymmetric world war moulded by these threats has been preoccupying analysts as well as public opinion for the last decade.
It is important to examine in detail the background of the recent intensification of the thesis of a global scale war that blends conventional and asymmetric threats and attacks.
It is inevitable that this thesis will be the basis of a credible analysis, provided that it is based on solid intelligence data from the field. On the other hand, it is observed that some circles, who claim that we are on the eve of a global war, manipulate public opinion in line with a certain agenda and purpose, and adopt a line based on perception far from a factual basis with populist impulses.
In the last few years, the discourse of the “Third World War” has been brought up by Turkish officials on various occasions. For instance, since 2022, President Erdoğan has frequently used the rhetoric evoking global war in reference to the West. Most recently, before attending the NATO Leaders’ Summit in Washington in July 2024, he made statements implying the possibility of a “Third World War“. While expressing this view, he blamed the global warmongering on Western arms dealers, as if there had not been close defence cooperation and trade between Turkey and Ukraine for years. On 25 November, one of the main agenda items of the Presidential Cabinet is the risk of global war.
Foreign Minister Fidan also played a role in keeping the global war claim in circulation. For example, in a statement he made in June 2024, Minister Fidan mentioned the risk of world war. In a statement he made in November 2024, he underlined the danger of a nuclear war.
It is natural that this worst-case scenario, which has been repeatedly raised by the Turkish administration circles and their supporters about the risk of a global war with a nuclear dimension, will have consequences that will cause the public to worry. The question to be asked at this point is to what extent this discourse used in Turkey and abroad reflects the reality.
US and UK Steps and Putin’s Exit
In recent days, it is observed that a significant escalation has emerged in the Russia-based war in Ukraine with the developments including the use of nuclear weapons. It is observed that the current escalation has led the world public opinion to worry.
The first step came with Putin’s update in September 2024, which “lowered” the threshold for using nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Putin signed the “new nuclear doctrine“ in November 2024.
One of the main factors pushing Putin in this direction was Biden’s decision to authorise the use of the US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which has a range of approximately 310 km, to target Russian territory. Immediately after this, the world public saw the UK’s long-range Storm Shadow missiles being used on Russian territory. France was not left behind in the race for authorisation. The French Foreign Minister announced that French long-range missiles could be used by Ukraine against Russia in “selfdefence”.
This is how things got complicated before Trump took office in the USA. Russia and North Korea have also taken their place on the stage in triggering a process fraught with dangers that could spiral out of control if this escalation is not prevented. The deployment of some 11,000 North Korean troops in the Kursk region occupied by Ukraine in accordance with the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed by Russia and North Korea in June 2024 paved the way for the US, Britain and France to use their long-range missiles against Russia. This development, in turn, paved the way for Russia to reintroduce the card of using nuclear force in Ukraine.
The sad claims of the owners of Moscow’s rhetoric in Turkey that there is no concrete information on the deployment of North Korean troops in Kursk did not escape attention. It has become clear that those circles who assume that military mobilisations/deployments cannot be detected in our age of such advanced intelligence-reconnaissance-surveillance capabilities are only consoling themselves, but they do not hesitate to mislead the public opinion.
Are We Heading for Nuclear War?
Since February 2022, when Russia began its second invasion of Ukraine, it has been a common reaction pattern for the Russian leadership to threaten the use of nuclear force when they see the situation on the ground turning against them. Putin, Medvedev and Lavrov have been the main actors in this threat.
Russia responded to Ukraine’s use of long-range missiles against military positions on Russian territory by launching a new type of hypersonic missile with medium-range, heavy-duty conventional warheads. Russia also had an interest in the war in its earlier stages.Kinzhal” type hypersonic missiles is known to be used. By using more capable hypersonic missiles in its latest attack, Russia has signalled to the West that if it is “squeezed” further, it can resort to nuclear-tipped missiles.
Following the recent mutual missile attacks between Russia and Ukraine, alarm bells are ringing in the world public opinion, especially against a nuclear war scenario. On the other hand, it is known that since the beginning of the war, the European members of NATO, particularly the United States, have declared that they would not engage in a direct military conflict with Russia in Ukraine and that they would avoid a confrontation that would involve a nuclear dimension. In any case, it is an open secret that they are closely monitoring the situation both at home and in NATO against Russia’s nuclear threats. It is also an objective reality that the intelligence information obtained by the Western powers through various channels reveals that there is no serious movement in the organisation of Russian nuclear forces. On the other hand, it is also a well-known fact that the risk of Russia’s use of tactical nuclear weapons with lower destructive power in Ukraine in the stages preceding the recent re-emergence of the nuclear threat has caused concern among Western countries and other relevant actors.
The fact that the concern about nuclear war, and thus the outbreak of a possible global war, has come back to the agenda with the recent developments makes it necessary to analyse the “new nuclear doctrine” introduced by Russia. In this context, it is first necessary to recall the main components of Russia’s traditional doctrine of the use of nuclear force. These can be summarised as follows:
- Nuclear weapons can be used for Russia’s strategic goals under the leadership of the Russian Commander-in-Chief (Putin) and the command of the Chief of the General Staff.
- In the face of a conventional attack against Russia that it cannot cope with, it could be deployed to stop it and de-escalate.
- If weapons of mass destruction are used in an attack against Russia or its allies, or if the fight is against an adversary prepared to use such weapons, the use of nuclear force may be justified.
As can be seen, the current doctrine contains almost every element of the so-called “new” doctrine, which essentially provides Putin with the necessary flexibility in the use of nuclear weapons. In this respect, it is not so much a new doctrine as a reaffirmation of the main elements of the existing doctrine regarding the flexibility to use nuclear force in the current public opinion. In short, we are confronted with an updated version of the declaratory nuclear deterrence that Russia used frequently throughout the war.
On the other hand, at a time when the arms control/disarmament architecture has collapsed, Russia’s threat to use nuclear force, this time more emphatically, is not a picture to be taken lightly. Therefore, there is no legal arrangement that can, so to speak, bind Russia’s hands de jure (on a covenantal basis). Therefore, it is obvious that Putin’s latest “doctrinal outburst” cannot be covered up.
Nevertheless, it is possible to observe that the “laxity” displayed by Putin and his entourage in using the nuclear card, in a way that also demonstrates Moscow’s occasional incapacity, is also extremely disturbing for China, with which it has an “unlimited partnership”. For example, in the eighth article of its position paper announced in February 2023 to lay the groundwork for a possible peace framework to end the war in Ukraine one year after the war, China has stated its clear position on the use of nuclear force in the following terms:
“… Nuclear weapons must not be used and nuclear wars must not be fought. The threat or use of nuclear weapons must be opposed. Nuclear (weapons) proliferation must be prevented and nuclear crisis must be avoided…” Immediately after Putin’s announcement of his “new nuclear doctrine”, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that “all parties concerned should remain calm, show prudence, and jointly strive to stop escalation and reduce strategic risks through dialogue and consultations”.
It is clear that Moscow would “lose” China if it were to go crazy and resort to the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. This loss would not only be limited to China, but would also include many countries in the “Global South”. In this respect, China’s clear and unequivocal stance against the use of nuclear weapons that would fuel a global war is one of the main obstacles for Putin. Another main obstacle is the fact that the “Mutually Assured Destruction” (Mutually Assured Destruction) balance of terror between Russia and the United States, as well as between Russia and NATO, which had its foundations in the Cold War era and was based on a smaller number of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era, is still valid, albeit weakened compared to the past. In this framework, the main question is whether Russia will exhibit a “state of insanity” that would initiate a nuclear war and thus bring about its own demise. From this point of view, Russia’s shift from “rhetoricbased nuclear deterrence” to “action-based nuclear deterrence” is highly unlikely under the current circumstances.
At this point, another question centres on why the Third World War/Nuclear War discourse is kept in circulation by the governments of some countries. It is observed that such governments, which generally have autocratic characteristics, are more inclined to use this discourse for their domestic politics and thus for their own survival. Putin, on the other hand, resorts to this method in order to send a message to both his own public opinion and the outside world that “we are strong because we have nuclear weapons”. This morbid state of mind, which has spread to its peers in other countries, can also be seen as the manifestation of a sad symptom of the leadership in Moscow, which does not hesitate to circulate nuclear catastrophe scenarios in desperation.
