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SUMMITS ON STAGE

In the last five years, when global politics has been heating up, the months of June have witnessed important Summits, especially in the Western world. June 2024 was in line with the recent pattern of Summits.

On June 13-15, the leaders of the G7 countries gathered in Apulia/Italy to mark the 50th anniversary of the G7, in the midst of a world-wide flux with the start of 2024. At the end of the summit, they issued a comprehensive Declaration setting out their positions on the fundamental issues shaking the world.

Immediately after the G7 Summit, the Ukraine Peace Conference was organized in Bürgenstock/Switzerland. 92 countries participated in this Conference . Within this framework, 60 Heads of State and Government and nearly 100 delegations took part in the Conference. Russia was not invited to the Conference and therefore China did not attend, while US President Biden did not take part in the Conference despite the intense efforts of Ukrainian

President Zelensky. Acting President Harris represented the US at the Conference. Foreign Minister Fidan attended the Conference from Turkey. At the end of the Conference, 80 countries signed the short “joint” Declaration. Therefore, not all participants were in agreement with the Declaration. For instance, India, which is an important actor in the Asia-Pacific alongside China and claims to be the voice of the “Global South”, as well as South Africa, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Mexico and the UAE were among the countries that attended the Conference but did not sign the Declaration. Turkey was among the countries that signed the Declaration.

Most recently, EU Heads of State and Government met on the occasion of the

Summit in Brussels on June 27-28. Prior to this Summit, on June 25, the EU Council decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, which was expected but noteworthy.

The decisions taken at these three important Summits, which will shape the practices of the Western world in the coming period, can be summarized as follows:

G7 DECISIONS

As with many previous G7 Summit Communiqués, the latest G7 Summit

Communiqué is extremely comprehensive. It is observed that the Declaration assesses global challenges in a wide range and in almost every component. In this framework, an analysis of the Declaration, which consists of nearly 200 paragraphs and 32 separate chapters, reveals that the G7 summarizes the global challenges as follows:

• Continue to show solidarity with Ukraine in its fight for freedom from Russian occupation and in rebuilding its economy and infrastructure, no matter how long it takes. In this context, the proceeds from Russia’s frozen assets abroad, amounting to some $50 billion, should be used to rebuild Ukraine in accordance with national and international law.
• An immediate ceasefire in Gaza, the release of all hostages and a credible path to peace that leads to a two-state solution. In this context, implement UNSCR 2735 and provide substantial and sustainable humanitarian assistance to Gaza.
• Engaging African countries in a spirit of equitable and strategic partnership. In this context, increase efforts to invest in the sustainable infrastructure of African countries.
• Empower countries to invest in their future and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Support the creation of better, bigger and more effective Multilateral Development Banks to increase the World Bank’s lending capacity by $70 billion over the next decade. Mobilize the international community to address countries’ debt burden.
• Reaffirm commitment to gender equality. Together with International

Financial Institutions, release at least $20 billion to empower women.

• Address the triple crisis of climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss, and commit to National-Scale Contributions to meet the ambitious target of 1.5 degrees Celsius increase in global climate. Lead global efforts to protect forests, oceans and end plastic pollution.
• Addressing the challenges and opportunities posed by migration in partnership with countries of origin and transit. Focusing on the root causes of irregular migration, improving border management, preventing transnational organized crime, identifying routes to make migration orderly and safe, preventing migrant smuggling.
• Deepen cooperation to harness the benefits of Artificial Intelligence. In this context, support the implementation of the International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced Artificial Intelligence.
• Encourage strong and inclusive global economic development, ensure financial stability, promote employment in economic investment, and accelerate the transition to digital and clean energy. Continue the commitment to strengthen the rules-based multilateral trading system and implement an international tax system that is more stable, fair and fit for the 21st century.
• Promote economic resilience, oppose non-market policies and practices aimed at undermining a level playing field in economic relations and economic security; coordinate to address global (productive) overcapacity challenges.

The salient features of the G7 Declaration can be summarized as follows:

• While reaffirming the commitment of the G7 member states to the system of values on which the Western world is based and their determination to maintain a rules-based world order, the Declaration paints a picture of the current global environment that is evolving towards multipolarity, with inclusive, broad representation for all stakeholders, multilateral pursuits and initiatives, based on the rule of law as a value, aiming at the spread of global prosperity, and in this context, envisaging more openness to the “Global South” with a focus on Africa and more cooperation with this geographical belt.
• The Declaration reflects the spirit of a period of heightened geopolitical tensions. In this framework, it is observed that the G7 has preferred to prioritize geopolitical and geostrategic issues, while its decisions on other issues of concern to the global order have been included in the lower sections of the Declaration.
• In the very comprehensive Declaration, 17 paragraphs are devoted to Ukraine. This is followed by the Gaza issue with 10 paragraphs and China with 9 paragraphs under the sub-heading

“Indo-Pacific”. It is interesting to note that the “China question” is mentioned after Ukraine, Gaza, freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, Iran and Africa. Therefore, it is noteworthy that China is not mentioned under a separate heading in the Declaration. In the writings on China, there seems to be a preference for dialogue and engagement with this country. The necessity of cooperation with China in areas such as the climate crisis, biodiversity, global environmental pollution including plastics, combating synthetic drug trafficking, ensuring macroeconomic stability, promoting global health security, and the sustainability of the economies and financial needs of vulnerable debtor countries is recognized. On the other hand, a stance is taken against China’s use of its economic power as a coercive threat multiplier, especially in its region, the escalation caused by its military actions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, its preference for routes that could disrupt world supply chains, including critical minerals, and the unfair competition that occurs globally through the Chinese economy’s surplus production and subsidization of its companies. Despite this stance, the G7 countries reaffirm in the Declaration that they continue to support the One China Policy. It is not possible to argue that the consensual spellings used for China are compatible with the rising US-China competition. In this context, it can be said that the non-confrontational wording in the Declaration reflects the consensus between the US and other G7 member states.

• Another striking feature of the Declaration is the inclusion of a series of initiatives and projects, with a focus on Africa, to win over, so to speak, the “Global South”, where the three major powers (the United States, Russia and China) are in competition, and to positively change the outlook and attitudes of the societies in this belt towards the rich “Global North”. In the context of its relations with the West, the door is open for the “Global South” to take advantage of the current situation of heightened strategic competition to advance its collective interests.
• The Declaration emphasizes the importance of sustainability and diversification of global supply (and value) chains, the establishment of new chains, and the importance of connectivity at the global level. In this context, the Declaration includes references to the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) Initiative, including the EU Global Gateway Initiative, among the economic corridors to be promoted, invested in and financially supported. Middle Corridor The inclusion of the Middle Corridor in the list of projects to be supported is noteworthy. In the context of connectivity, which is one of the direct subjects of global competition, the inclusion of the Middle Corridor among the projects to be supported is undoubtedly important and Turkey should continuously seek ways to benefit from this situation.
• It is noteworthy that the Declaration refers to the Black Sea in the context of the importance of the “Grain from Ukraine” initiative announced by President Zelensky and the EU’s “Solidarity Lanes” project (which includes the Black Sea) in ensuring uninterrupted transportation of grain, food products, fertilizers and agricultural inputs from Ukraine to countries in need.
• The sections of the Declaration dealing with innovative and breakthrough technologies, which are both a core issue of geopolitical contestation and an area for cooperation, also contain noteworthy insights and assessments. In this context, the commitment to provide the necessary support for the realization of small modular reactors with advanced technologies, including microreactors, which are candidates to replace conventional systems in the current civilian nuclear energy field, is important and will undoubtedly be followed up. Similarly, the transition from fission technology in nuclear reactors, which poses many safety risks, to a fusion-based system has been emphasized. In this context, it is important and imperative that Ankara prioritizes actively participating in fusion-based nuclear energy projects and initiatives, which will involve much more advanced technologies, instead of conventional nuclear energy cooperation that will bring dependence on Russia.
• The Declaration also includes sections on symmetrical and asymmetrical current challenges such as economic-social challenges caused by irregular migration, measures to prevent irregular migration, meeting commitments and implementing decisions taken to strengthen gender equality and the social role of women, implementing anti-corruption initiatives and strengthening cyber security. In this context, the Declaration provides a concrete basis for these important areas of direct and close concern for Turkey.
• In the Declaration, it is seen that among the groundbreaking technologies, Artificial Intelligence is predominantly evaluated and the importance of global cooperation in the regulation and management of this technology, which will have wide-ranging consequences both in the digitalization process and in sectors such as economy-trade-production-labor, is emphasized. It is noteworthy that the same idea is also being addressed in the field of quantum technologies. In this context, it is vital for Turkey to consider these two technology sectors outside of vicious domestic political disputes. The use of outer space and the profound socioeconomic impact of space technologies should be added to this. As a matter of fact, it is no coincidence that the use of outer space and its effects on economic and social life are covered extensively in the Declaration.
• Unfortunately, the shallow agenda indexed to domestic politics, which unfortunately prevails in Turkey, did not make it possible to evaluate the various components of the G7 Summit decisions in a satisfactory framework, and the only issue that was brought to the attention of the public was limited to the issue of the use of the income from Russia’s assets abroad to support Ukraine. The fact that the decisions of the last G7 Summit, which is one of the most important formations of the Western world and which includes countries with which we have intensive relations in terms of Turkish economy, trade and defense, were pushed to the background of the agenda from the perspective of the universal values that the civilized world is trying to defend on the one hand, and the various components of the G7 vision for the coming decades on the other hand, revealed an exemplary but not surprising picture.

UKRAINE PEACE CONFERENCE

The Ukraine Peace Conference hosted by Switzerland on June 15-16 can be interpreted on its own merits. On the other hand, it should be noted that this Conference is a new link in the process triggered by the 10–Point Plan presented by President Zelensky to the G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia in November 2022.

The Plan is expected to include nuclear safety, food security for Asian and African countries, Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, the release of prisoners of war and the return to Ukraine of Ukrainian children taken to Russia during the war, the restoration of the 1991 Russian-Ukrainian border, and the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukrainian territory, It is known to include punishment for Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine, compensation for the environmental damage caused to Ukraine by the war, security guarantees for Ukraine against possible future Russian aggression, and the organization of a peace conference and an international treaty.

In the run-up to the Peace Conference in Switzerland to achieve peace in

Ukraine, a series of conferences were held in Copenhagen in June 2023, in Jeddah in August 2023, hosted by Malta in October 2023 and on the margins of the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2024.

Each of the five Peace Conferences, including the one in Switzerland, addressed the various components of Ukraine’s 2022 Plan, emphasizing elements that could form the basis for a possible peace, but not a concrete peace agreement, but a framework for the process leading to peace.

Actors such as China, Brazil and India have emerged who see the fact that Russia, as a belligerent party, has not been invited to the Peace Conferences so far as a deficiency. On the eve of the Conference in Switzerland, Putin announced Russia’s conditions for a possible peace. Reiterating that the government elected by the Ukrainian people was illegitimate and should be “de-Nazified”, Putin stated that peace negotiations could begin immediately if Ukrainian troops withdrew from the Donbas region and if Ukraine remained a neutral country without nuclear weapons and thus renounced its NATO membership. It would be overly optimistic to expect Ukraine, which has suffered many casualties in the war, to accept these conditions in the current environment.

Despite the current pessimistic mood, a significant part of the international community continues to seek a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. The conferences held last year and the Peace Conference in June 2024 are manifestations of this quest.

At the end of the fifth Conference in Switzerland, a short Declaration was issued with three operative points. In its introduction, the main objective of the Conference was defined as “to foster a high-level dialogue towards identifying pathways towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace for Ukraine”.

The Declaration, which emphasizes the obligation to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries, which are among the main principles of the UN Charter, as essentially included in the declarations of previous Conferences, has been seen to put forward a ‘vision’ for a possible peace focusing on the following three areas:

• Any use of nuclear energy and nuclear facilities must be safe, secure, under safeguards established (by the IAEA) and environmentally sound. Ukraine’s nuclear power plants and facilities, including the Zaporizhya nuclear power plant, should be operated safely and securely under Ukraine’s full sovereign control and under IAEA guidelines and oversight. The threat or use of nuclear weapons in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine is totally unacceptable.
• Global food security relies on an uninterrupted supply of food and food products. In this context, free, full and secure commercial navigation and access to ports in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov are critical. Attacks against merchant vessels sailing on all sea lanes along this route and against civilian ports and their infrastructure are unacceptable. Food security must not be used as a tool of war. Ukraine’s agricultural products must be safely and freely available to interested third countries.
• All prisoners of war must be released in full exchange. Ukrainian children deported and illegally displaced from Ukraine to Russia, as well as all other Ukrainian citizens similarly detained, should be returned to Ukraine.
• It is believed that in order to achieve peace, it is necessary to engage all parties and establish a dialogue between them. It was therefore agreed to undertake concrete steps in the future to bring together representatives of all parties in the areas identified for this Conference.

The UN Charter, including the principles of respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states, can/will serve to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine.

In fact, it can be argued that the 10-Point Plan announced by Ukraine in 2022 is gradually being implemented. For example, on March 17, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Arrest warrant  has been issued. This is in line with the

Plan’s proposal to “establish a special tribunal for Russia’s war crimes” in the “Justice” section. Likewise, the spirit of the G7 and EU decisions to collect the proceeds of Russia’s frozen assets abroad as a form of compensation for Ukraine is in line with the Ukraine Plan. The Peace Conference in Switzerland focused on three areas to advance the implementation of the Plan, which will be pursued in the future. In this way, the Peace Plan appears to be gradually being implemented without Russia.

Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, Ankara has taken a cautious and prudent approach to the war that has erupted on its doorstep, seeking to find a middle ground between the two warring sides as much as possible. This has manifested itself in bringing the parties together at the Antalya Diplomatic Forum and in Istanbul, playing a role in the exchange of prisoners of war and in the rehabilitation of Ukrainian children who lost their parents in the war, and ensuring the implementation of the Grain Corridor under UN auspices.

Turkey’s participation in the Ukraine Peace Conference in Switzerland at the Foreign Minister level and its signature of the Declaration issued at the end of the Conference is in line with its policy since the beginning of the war. In this context, it is in Turkey’s interest for Ankara to actively participate in all peace initiatives and activities aimed at ending the war in Ukraine.

EU SUMMIT

The conclusions of the EU Summit held in Brussels on 27-28 June appear to be largely in line with the spirit and letter of the Conclusions announced on the occasion of the Summit on 21–22 March. 

On the decisions taken at the June 2024 EU Summit Results document consists of seven headings. The main topics are Ukraine, Middle East, Security and Defense, Competition, Other Items, Future Institutional Cycle and Roadmap for Future Work on Domestic Reforms.

The decisions on Ukraine broadly follow the conclusions of the previous Summit and are in line with those of the G7 Summit in June 2024. In this context, it is reiterated that political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine will be sustained for as long as it takes and as intensively as needed. In short, the EU reaffirmed its will to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience and overall resilience against the Russian occupation. In addition, the EU welcomed the outcome of the Peace Conference held in Switzerland on June 15-16 and expressed its support for the principles and objectives set out in the Conference Declaration.

Under the Middle East heading, the EU position on the consequences of the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict is of course explained. In this context, the EU condemns the Hamas terrorist attacks and the unlawful Israeli operations in Gaza in response, which have resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians and innocent people, condemns the illegal settlements in the West Bank and the violence perpetrated by Israeli extremists against Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and emphasizes the need to preserve the Status of Jerusalem. In conclusion, the EU will support the political process leading to a two-state solution in which Israel and Palestine can exist side by side in peace, security and mutual recognition. It is noteworthy that the EU, referring to the legally binding nature of the UNSC Resolution 2735 as well as the ICJ judgment of 24 May 2024 in the face of the situation in Gaza, emphasized the necessity to apply it also in the context of the ground operations in Rafah.

Under the Middle East chapter, the EU also expresses its concern about the growing tensions between Israel and Lebanon and in this context, although not explicitly stated, it is reported that the threat against any EU member state is condemned in the strongest terms in the context of Lebanese Hezbollah leader Nasrallah’s warning to the SCGA.

Under the Security and Defense heading, closing the EU’s critical capability gaps, the

European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the European Defense Industry Program (EDIP) and calls for work to be taken forward within the Council, Members and the Commission.

Among the decisions taken under the heading “Other Items”, the reference to the Black Sea is noteworthy. In this context, in light of the importance of the security and stability of the Black Sea, the Council tasks the Commission and the High

Representative to prepare a Joint Declaration to establish the EU’s strategic approach to the Black Sea.

Under this heading, it is noteworthy to point out that hybrid threats against the EU and its members, especially from Russia, have increased recently and that they will be resolutely counteracted.

Among the most important decisions of the last EU Summit was the appointment of the

EU’s top officials, which was the subject of intense negotiations and bargaining among

EU members. At this Summit, António Costa, the former socialist Prime Minister of Portugal, was elected President of the European Council for the next three years, Ursula von der Leyen, the current President of the Commission, was elected to remain in office, and Kaja Kallas, the Prime Minister of Estonia, was nominated as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The main difference of the EU Summit from the previous one is that it adopted the

Strategic Agenda for the period 2024-2029. It is necessary to consider the five-year Agenda in conjunction with the Strategic Compass, which the EU announced in March 2022, in order to have a more holistic perspective.

The main lines of the EU Strategic Agenda document can be summarized as follows:

• The global political scene is being reshaped in the face of strategic competition, growing instability in the world and attempts to undermine the “rules-based order”. In this context, global challenges include Russia’s war in Ukraine, the dramatic situation in the Middle East, the damage to nature and the environment caused by climate change, loss of biodiversity and pollution, and the opportunities and risks posed by innovative technologies.
• The common values on which the EU is built represent its strength. Based on these values, the EU will resolutely support the international legal order, the UN and its Charter, and pursue efforts to promote global peace, justice and stability, as well as democracy, universal human rights and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all international fora. It will strive to make the reformed multilateral system more inclusive and effective. In this context, the EU seems to be moving away from the “effective multilateralism” approach that it has been advocating since the early 2000s towards “inclusive multilateralism“.
• In a multi-polar geopolitical framework, the EU will adapt itself to the goal of becoming a “global strategic player” through internal and external adaptive measures in an environment where the world is becoming more confrontational, retail and uncertain.
• In line with this ambitious goal, it will allocate more resources to security and defense and take steps to ensure that the European defense industry develops more capacity and capabilities. It will play a complementary role to NATO, the backbone of collective defense, and increase cooperation with transatlantic partners without prejudice to the commitments of NATO member states to the Alliance and the EU Treaties.
• It will continue its fight against organized crime and transnational criminal activities, radicalization, terrorism and extremism.
• The EU will strengthen its resilience, preparedness and capacity to prevent and respond to crises on the basis of a “whole-of-society approach”.
• Taking into account the current geopolitical realities, it will take as a basis to admit its partners aiming to become members of the EU by evaluating them on the basis of merit in line with EU values.
• Strengthen border management to prevent irregular migration in the framework of the protection of the EU’s external borders and cooperate in a mutually beneficial manner with countries of origin and transit along migration routes.
• It will increase investments in various sectors such as energy, infrastructure, water, transport and communications to enhance the competitiveness of the Single Market and ensure a green and digital transition.
• It will prioritize research and innovation to maintain its competitiveness in new and groundbreaking technologies in light of the fact that economies are becoming more information and data-based. In this framework, it will take steps to facilitate the work of the digitalizing business world, reduce bureaucracy, and pave the way for small and medium-sized enterprises and ‘start-ups’.
• The EU will invest more in human resources to improve the skills and general and in-service training of its citizens, thus prioritizing the achievement of collective prosperity.

CONCLUSION

With the exception of a limited number of circles, the decisions taken at the back-toback Summits held throughout June 2024 and their possible consequences have not been sufficiently on the radar of the shallow political establishment in Turkey, nor of most think tanks that feed on this situation. In Turkey’s current sterile environment, this is to be expected.

It has been observed that the outcomes of the Summits have been subjected to evaluations, even by these limited number of circles, with a focus on the Summit in question. Unfortunately, to date, there has been no comprehensive content analysis or comparative analysis of the decisions of the Summits in a holistic framework and no mapping of the linkages between the decisions taken in this context. However, if efforts had been made for a holistic analysis, a picture would have emerged that would have made it possible to reach healthier conclusions. From this perspective, it cannot be said that such an effort has been made to better analyze at least the Western world’s perspective on the current challenges in a transitional period when the global order is in such turmoil and Turkey is also affected by this turmoil.

July 2024 will also witness a succession of important summits. In this framework, the SCO Summit will be held on July 3-4, the Organization of Turkic States on July 6, and the NATO Leaders’ Summit on July 9-11. As these Summits take place, it will not be unusual for the majority of the Turkish public opinion to be directed towards the tabloid and personal dimension of the Summits in line with the current preference rather than the Summit decisions and the interaction between them.

On the other hand, it is not a luxury but a necessity to think of the developments in our region and beyond as separate from each other, and to explain the links and dynamics between them to the public in an understandable language. Because, if the processes triggered by the Summits are not analyzed correctly, and if Turkey’s preferences within this framework are determined with an approach that is far from holistic, it is inevitable that not only Turkish foreign and security policies but also all segments of society will be negatively affected.

It is to be hoped that the pattern of fragmented and often biased approach to the June 2024 Summits will not be repeated in July 2024.

The Middle East has been plagued for centuries by conflicts among the peoples of the region, global geopolitical power struggles and interventions by extra-regional actors.

The Palestinian issue, which has constituted the main issue in the region since the establishment of Israel in 1948, had fallen into the background for a while with the “Arab Spring” that started in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and spread, and the developments that followed.

With the October 7 attack by Hamas and the events that followed, it again became the focal point of the region and the world.

As a result of the military operation launched by Israel in response, more than 35,000 Palestinians, mostly women and children, have lost their lives in Gaza, where 2.3 million people live, and international law and humanitarian law have been trampled on.

This human tragedy, which has been going on for seven months, has provoked reactions even in countries that support Israel, and genocide cases have been filed against Israel in international courts.

Most recently, an arrest warrant has been issued for Prime Minister Netanyahu and several other senior Israeli officials to be taken to the International Criminal Court.

Prime Minister Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of the coalition government representing the extreme right and ultra-orthodox sectors in Israel, has declared that the operation will continue until Hamas is destroyed, but despite its technological superiority and high firepower, Israel is unlikely to achieve this maximalist goal.

The war in Gaza has not been confined to Gaza, but has spilled over into the region and beyond.

In response to Hezbollah’s and Iran’s harassment and activities, Israel is striking targets in Lebanon and Syria.

In Yemen, the Iranian-backed Houthis, one of the parties to Yemen’s long-running civil war, have been targeting ships around Bab al-Mandab, the gateway to the shortest and most economical sea route linking the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, causing disruptions in the global supply chain.

In response to the attack on the annex of the Iranian embassy in Damascus on April 13, more than 300 drones and missiles were fired at Israel from Iran, as well as from various locations in Iraq, Yemen and Syria, and Israel responded by attacking targets in Isfahan.

Since Iran had announced in advance that it was going to attack, 99 percent of the attack vehicles were destroyed outside Israeli territory by the air defense systems of Israel, the United States and some other countries, and only a few fell into Israel, but the significance of this crisis was that it was the first time that the two sides had targeted each other openly and directly with such intensity. In this way, the rules of engagement changed.

In a similar crisis in the future, the possibility that the means of attack could be equipped with weapons of mass destruction is a nightmare scenario.

The protests by students at US universities demanding a halt to Israel’s Gaza offensive have also made waves around the world.

The United States remains a key country, with its influence over Israel and its deterrent and destructive military power against Israel’s enemies.

Faced with these crises shortly before the crucial presidential elections in November, US President Joe Biden is caught between a rock and a hard place.

The United States has expressed its displeasure with Israel’s conduct of the Gaza offensive in various ways, including abstaining from voting in the United Nations Security Council and sanctioning Jewish settlers who attack Palestinians.

Nevertheless, it continues its traditional policy of strongly siding with Israel. Most recently, Congress approved a $26 billion military aid package to Israel.

The other key players in the Gaza crisis, the Arab countries, have reacted to the devastation caused by Israel’s offensive, but have not confronted Israel as a bloc with political, economic or military measures.

The Arab Peace Plan, unanimously adopted by leaders at the Arab Summit in Beirut in 2002, envisaged normalization with Israel in return for the restoration of Palestinian rights and withdrawal from the occupied territories.

However, without waiting for these conditions to be met, the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020 ushered in a new phase between Israel and the Arab world, with some progress even between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Although the Gaza operation affected this positive atmosphere, none of the Arab countries that signed peace agreements and established diplomatic relations with Israel (Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Morocco and Sudan) severed relations with Israel.

There are several factors that have contributed to this attitude of Arab countries.

Instead of the old approach based on the elimination of Israel, Arab countries, especially the Gulf states, are now focusing on creating an environment in which they can realize their vision of transforming their countries economically, socially and politically, and their multi-billion dollar projects for this purpose, in which there is room for Israel and Palestine.

Egypt, one of the heavyweights of the Arab world, is struggling to get its economy back on track. Concerned about the repercussions of the war in Gaza and a possible influx of Palestinian refugees into Sinai, Egypt is working to end the crisis as soon as possible.

So is Jordan, a fragile state that has always been directly affected by Palestinian events.

An important factor driving the Arab countries is the conflict between the political Islamists and the Arab monarchies, as well as between the Arab monarchies and the secular, so-called liberal elements, which also played an important role in determining the fate of the “Arab Spring”.

Most Arab countries do not sympathize with Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which also has close ties with Iran, and refrain from supporting the organization, even in the name of the Palestinian cause.

The Arab countries see Iran as a risk factor that complicates the region and interferes in the internal affairs of the Arabs, and their concerns have an impact on their orientation in international relations, including the level of their relations with Israel and the United States.

Recent developments between Iran and various Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, have given the impression that relations are normalizing, but the centuries-old animosity, rooted in sectarian conflict, is not easy to end.

Political polarization among Palestinians and Israelis is also an obstacle to ending the crisis and finding a lasting solution to the Palestinian issue.

The rift between Fatah and Hamas, headed by Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, is as sharp as the rift between Palestinians and Israelis.

As the Gaza war rages on, Fatah and Hamas representatives have been meeting in search of inter-Palestinian reconciliation. The last time they met in Beijing, no positive outcome was announced. They also met in Moscow in February.

In Israel, too, there is a deep rift between the extreme right-wing and ultra-orthodox and the moderate, secular, liberal camp.

The protests of anti-Netanyahu Israelis, especially the relatives of the hostages in Gaza, are an indication of the divisions in Israeli society.

The strong Israeli economy, at least to date, has not been adversely affected by the crisis, but this could change if the crisis is prolonged and widespread.

While the focus of the crisis is on Gaza, the situation in the West Bank is also extremely tense. The provocative actions of Jewish settlers and their attacks on Palestinians could escalate the situation to a much more serious level.

There are around 750,000 Jewish settlers living in illegal settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which are defined as occupied territories by the United Nations.

Another nightmare scenario for Israel is that Palestinians in the West Bank and Israeli Arabs take to the streets and the crisis spreads throughout the country.

Two million of Israel’s 9.7 million inhabitants are Palestinians, known as Israeli Arabs. The Palestinian population in the West Bank is around 3 million.

The international community is currently focused on ceasefire efforts and a possible Israeli military operation in Rafah.

The United States, Egypt and Qatar have been at the forefront of efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza.

US Secretary of State Blinken, who once again visited the region, said that “Israel has offered a very generous ceasefire” and that he hoped Hamas would accept it.

After intense diplomacy and persuasion, on the evening of May 6, Hamas announced that it had accepted the ceasefire agreement proposed by Qatar and Egypt.

Israel, on the other hand, announced that the text Hamas had accepted was watered down and that the Israeli army would not end the operation until Rafah was cleared of Hamas.

There seems to be confusion about the elements of the ceasefire agreement.

It is not unusual in Middle East diplomacy for the supposedly agreed text to be different for each party, or for different promises to be made to each party to create the impression that an agreement has been reached.

Netanyahu’s coalition partners, the far right and the ultra-orthodox, have threatened to leave the coalition if a ceasefire agreement is reached, so Netanyahu must make moves that satisfy his partners and his support base.

According to Hamas officials, the ceasefire agreement consists of three phases, each lasting 42 days, including a cessation of operations, a hostage/prisoner exchange, the authorization of humanitarian access and the withdrawal of military forces.

What matters more than the agreement itself is whether the parties have the will to implement it.

Since the beginning of the crisis, Turkey has endeavored to pursue an active policy and, like the majority of the international community, is of the view that the operation in Gaza must stop immediately and that lasting peace is only possible through a two-state solution.

What differentiates Turkey from other countries is not its support for the Palestinian cause, but its position on Hamas.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan defines Hamas as a resistance organization fighting for liberation, not a terrorist organization.

Erdoğan welcomed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh and his delegation to Turkey recently and sent a message to the world and Turkish public opinion.

In a statement he made just before this visit, he equated Hamas with the Kuvayi Milliye.

The government sees Hamas from what it considers the glass half full, but Israel and many other countries, including the US and the Arabs, see Hamas as a terrorist organization.

Turkey appears to be on a mission to convince the world that Hamas should be addressed.

Turkish officials emphasize the political aspect of Hamas, which also participated in and won the 2006 Palestinian legislative council elections, rather than the armed aspect of Hamas, which operates under the name Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has stated that once a Palestinian state is established within the 1967 borders, Hamas’ military wing will no longer be needed and will continue to exist as a political movement.

Hamas’ 1988 founding charter was based on the destruction of Israel, which it defined as an illegal Zionist entity.

In the 2017 revised Charter, a more moderate approach was taken.

Those who look at the glass half full interpret Article 20 of the revised Charter, which states that “the establishment of an all-sovereign Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital, constitutes the national consensus among Palestinians”, as Hamas tacitly accepts the two-state solution and, indirectly, the existence of the state of Israel.

Israel and like-minded countries, on the other hand, are of the view that Hamas is a terrorist organization, that it has not given up on the idea of destroying Israel and terrorism, that it is pretending, but that it has shown its true face with the October 7 attack.

Turkey, like many other countries, wants to gain international prestige by contributing to ending the war and humanitarian tragedy in Gaza and to guarantee its place at the peace table where influential actors of the international community will come together.

However, Turkey’s stance on Hamas, in particular, could have a negative impact on its relations with Israel, as well as with the United States and most Arab countries, and may not allow it to take its desired place in peace efforts.

In the last few days, Turkey has adopted a proactive policy, announcing that it will intervene in South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice and that it has decided to completely halt its trade with Israel.

It can be said that Turkey decided to take these steps in order to set an example for other countries by taking concrete steps beyond words and to eliminate the criticism of “all talk and no action” from various circles in the domestic public opinion.

It seems that there will be no end to the violence in Gaza and that there will be no progress in resolving the Palestinian issue, but in the past, when it was thought that there would be no end to the violence, platforms where Israel and Arab countries came together were established, work was carried out and progress was made.

There was the Madrid Conference in 1991, the Oslo agreement in 1993 and other agreements after that.

Now, despite all the loss of life and destruction, it is very difficult, but not impossible, to establish a sustainable ceasefire and then to start a peace process on the basis of a two-state solution.

This can be achieved by;

-Take the initiative away from extremists,

-proving that the road to a Palestinian state would be paved,

-Regional countries to engage constructively in the process,

It is important that extra-regional actors, particularly the United States, who may have an impact on the process with their various attributes, should put forward a balanced and encouraging approach between the parties.

Even if a negotiation table can be set up to resolve the Palestinian issue, it will undoubtedly be a very difficult process due to highly sensitive issues such as the determination of borders, the status of Jerusalem, the return of refugees and Jewish settlements.

If Turkey pursues a rational, non-ideological policy, it has the potential to be one of the countries that can contribute positively to the resolution of the Palestinian issue and the establishment of peace and stability in the Middle East.