“It is better to act justly and be alone than to act unjustly and have all men follow you.” Mahatma Gandhi
“You cannot change history by turning portraits to face the wall.” Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.
In 2014, Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea and the emergence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq signalled a radical change in the global order. In the face of these developments, a series of steps taken by the US, the global power, brought the unipolar/multipolar world order debates to the agenda. Challenges to the global system by actors, particularly Russia, who placed the criticism of unipolarity at the centre of their policy-making processes, led to a number of revisionist policies, including the use of military force. As a result, the developments experienced since the beginning of the 2000s have once again had a shaking effect on the global system, which had failed to stabilise since the 1990s.
In this new period when the global order is experiencing swings, the evaluations on who could be the power or powers that could play a balancing role and prevent the formation of a unipolar world order centred on the USA have occupied the agenda. In the light of these assessments, the emergence of China as a rising power and the main rival that can stand against the US has shifted the cornerstones of world politics. The sharpened geopolitical and geostrategic struggle has had profound effects on the relations between global actors based on competition.
Starting from the Trump era, the superpower USA has turned towards balancing and containing China, which has emerged as its biggest rival in terms of economic-commercial-technological capacity, both in the Asia-Pacific and other sub-regions. While this global struggle was going on, the international agenda was further complicated by Russia’s increasing aggression in Ukraine, which was disturbed by the evolution of the global system, and the Israeli-Palestinian war that erupted in October 2023 following Hamas attacks. Under these challenging circumstances, Washington was forced to reorient its course towards the Euro-Atlantic region and the Middle East. The widening of the front and the divergence of urgencies and priorities have led to a slight de-escalation of the rivalry in the tensions with China.[1] has resulted. Global and regional
actors, particularly the US, h a v e endeavoured to redefine the elements and areas where they can cooperate under the challenging new conditions. The global system
In the context of the new power struggle that will shape the future, Europe-oriented structures such as NATO and the EU are carefully reviewing their strategies and priorities, while in the Asia-Pacific region, initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), which includes the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, and the Quadrilateral Security Pact between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, as well as India, have started to gain a place on the agenda due to critical power factors. As a result, the reemergence of threats posed by traditional states such as Russia alongside the threats posed by non-state actors under the heading of global terrorism has crystallised the importance of the regional connections of actors with global ambitions, particularly the US and China.
In this complex equation, India stands out as one of the important and valuable actors for the US and China in terms of its bilateral and multilateral connections, considering both its regional influence and global position. In terms of their regional and global imaginations, these two major players are reviewing and seeking to strengthen their relations with India. Simultaneously, understanding how India positions itself in global and regional relations and how it will determine its direction within this framework is important in terms of determining and understanding the new global balances.
India: New Endeavours in an Age of Disorganisation
It is observed that the founding fathers of India, which gained its independence in 1947, preferred to keep India outside the blocs in order to protect it from the destructive effects of the Cold War in the bipolar global order. In this framework, India acted as one of the leading actors of the Non-Aligned Movement, which came to the fore as an alternative path. It is possible to observe that India continues to carry non-alignment in its political genes as a legacy of the past, tries to maintain its balancing approach even in today’s complex web of relations, and deals with the problematic issues that have not been resolved since the Cold War period by considering new balances under the determining influence of this perspective.
The main issues of Indian foreign and security policy since the Cold War period include the rivalry with Pakistan and the Jammu and Kashmir issue, border disputes with China, the power struggle that has dominated South Asia since the 1970s with a focus on Afghanistan, and the negative effects of radical extremist movements originating from Afghanistan on India’s security. All these issues determine and are influenced by India’s political, military, commercial and economic relations with global actors such as the US, China and Russia as well as regional actors, particularly Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. It is obvious that India is a major and decisive actor in this equation, although it is a party to the problem, and that it is an effective factor in shaping the balances.
India, the world’s fifth largest economy, is a member of the G20, which can be regarded as the organisation of countries that are the driving force of the world economy. With its population that has recently surpassed China and its current economic development performance[2] is also a candidate to become one of the leading actors in global politics in the 2050s and beyond. In the field of new and groundbreaking technologies[3] It is seen that it has made significant progress. Although not officially recognised, India is a nuclear power in practice. In August 2023, it sent a spacecraft to the south of the Moon.[4] India has the status of the first country. In view of this overall picture, it is important that India, which is projected to be one of the global power centres of the future, carefully examines its approaches to regional security problems and the domestic problems it faces in order to understand the limits of the global and regional roles that India can play.
China or the USA?
India’s relations with both China and the United States are complex, involving political, military, economic and security dimensions. China is emerging as both a regional and global issue for India.
In terms of India’s trade volume with the big global duopoly, the US is in the lead, but with almost equal trade volumes. The volume of trade between India and China[5] When we look at the figures for 2022, we see a trade volume of 136.26 billion dollars. There is an unfavourable situation for India, which has a trade deficit of $ 118.77 billion in its trade with China.
When India’s trade volume with China is compared to that with the US, we see a different situation in favour of India. India-US trade volume[6] In 2022 figures, it is 191.8 billion dollars. India’s exports to the US account for $118.8 billion of this amount. The trade deficit in goods and services against the US is $45.7 billion in 2022 figures.
Although there is a balance against India in trade with both countries, it can be said that the economic and commercial structures of these three actors are articulated with each other. This
situation is political
It can be argued that it will create a kind of balance in relations and India will want to maintain a balance with both Washington and Beijing.
Looking at the recent developments at the global level in this context, it is seen that India has improved its relations with the US within the framework of QUAD. Modi’s four-day official visit to the US in June 2023[7] Through the agreements/contracts signed on the occasion, a commercial process that will amount to very serious amounts in innovation-based sectors, clean and renewable energy and critical components of the defence industry, including aircraft engine production, has been given life.
Another important development is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) announced at the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September 2023.[8] initiative. Although the possibility of this initiative being realised due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that started on 7 October 2023 and upset the balances in the Middle East is currently blurred, it is possible to consider it as a sign of a new search between India and the Western countries led by the United States. Despite its limitations and uncertainties, this grand project is an indication of US intentions in its strategic rivalry with China and of where India intends to position itself in South Asia and beyond. Taking into account the future imaginings, it can be foreseen that IMEC will play an important role in terms of the region and the positions of the main actors.
It can also be said that these pursuits with Western countries, particularly the US, aim to balance China. China’s global networking initiatives have harsher repercussions in and near the Indian Ocean, including India. As a matter of fact, not satisfied with China’s investments in the Gwadar harbour, the debt trapped Sri Lanka’s Hambantota[9] The acquisition of the majority shares and operating rights of the port of Djibouti, the agreement with Sri Lanka on port facilities in order to project power in the Indian Ocean, and the establishment of a naval base in Djibouti in 2017 bring competition to the fore in the cooperation-competition spiral for India.
As a matter of fact, the sea line starting from Gwadar and extending to Djibouti is a belt encircling India from the sea; therefore, it poses a security problem for India. In this framework, the US, which maintains its Asia-Pacific focus in the global system despite the war in Ukraine and the conflicts in the Middle East, has been using India in its competition with China and
China in South Asia.
India’s response to this is important in terms of regional and global balances. India’s response to this is important for regional and global balances.
How India-Russia Relations Developed and At What Stage?
When the course of diplomatic relations established between India and the Soviet Union in April 1947 is analysed, it is seen that India’s relations with Russia have progressed in a regular and stable line, as it has determined staying out of the blocs as the main axis of its foreign policy until the end of the Cold War. India has also successfully maintained a subtle balancing policy by utilising its ties with Russia against the US or China when necessary for its interests.[10]
The “India-Russia Declaration on Strategic Partnership” signed between the two countries in October 2000 during the period when Russia’s relations with the West were favourable is noteworthy. The level of this strategic partnership evolved into a “special and privileged strategic partnership” on the occasion of the official visit of then Russian President Medvedev to India in December 2010.
It is noteworthy that the Annual Summits held within the framework of the strategic partnership have been interrupted since 2021. Almost two years after Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the Indian Foreign Minister’s visit to Moscow in December 2023 and his reception by Putin during this visit increased Russian expectations that relations between the two countries would gain new momentum. At the end of this visit, the Indian Foreign Minister’s statements that the Annual Summit between the two countries would be resumed in
2024 aroused curiosity.[11]
The border dispute with China and China’s policy of balancing India through Pakistan are among the main reasons why India still wants to keep Russia on its side against China. On the other hand, while pursuing this policy, India has to take into account the fact that China and Russia have established an “unlimited partnership” relationship under the current conditions. It is clearly seen that India is orientated towards improving its relations with the West, especially with the US, in order to create a balance against this duo. Therefore, recent developments show that India has maintained its historical reflex of balancing the global powers as much as possible since its foundation. On the other hand, it is foreseeable that this fine line will be recalibrated by Indian leaders depending on the future course of the competing US-China relations and the position of Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine war. It would not be surprising for India to seek new alliances in the face of the reshaping balances in the Indo-Pacific
region.
reaffirmed/
Security or Trade?
In the context of global and regional security, India’s recent military exercises with the United States[12] The increase in the number of India’s foreign partners is noteworthy. It can be said that India tends to keep the US as an important balancing factor against China in global competition.
In this equation, it can be argued that the US has ‘polished’ India as a pivot actor in the AsiaPacific with an understanding based on interests against China. As a matter of fact, the announcement of the IMEC initiative on the occasion of the G20 Summit held in New Delhi in September 2023 is noteworthy in terms of revealing the future approach of the US in the context of relations with India in the Asia-Pacific.
On the other hand, it is a founding member of BRICS, which was launched in 2009, joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2017 and is the voice of the “Global South” when its interests require it.[13] It is also observed that India prefers to follow a path towards balancing the great powers as much as possible in the global competitive environment, taking into account the acquis inherited from its past history. In this framework, it can be assessed that India will try to open new areas for itself by preserving its strategic autonomy both in economic-commercial relations and in the field of security-defence.
Another security/threat dimension for India in the context of the Chinese threat is the possibility of simultaneous confrontation with Pakistan and China. The potential for a simultaneous, albeit low-intensity, conflict on two separate fronts (Pakistan and China) is probably a nightmare scenario for Indian rulers. In order to address this possibility, the Indian government’s “Defence Acquisition Procedures” (DAP) was introduced in 2020 to strengthen and indigenise the Indian defence industry.[14][15] It is observed that the Indian state institutions and armed forces have announced a document of approximately seven hundred pages, which is difficult to follow and read. Despite this document, it cannot be said that Indian state institutions and armed forces have a security strategy for the coming years. Moreover, it is unclear on which threat assessment the DAP document is based. Since defence requirements cannot be determined in a vacuum, the need to explain to the Indian public the rationale for
the preparation of such a comprehensive document remains open. Such an ambivalent and open-ended approach is not in line with the Indian security-oriented approach that takes into account the trends in global security, which is undergoing a radical transformation.
to criticism from some experts in the defence community[16] India is naturally exposed. Therefore, apart from the rhetoric of the Indian rulers, especially President Modi, India does not have a concrete strategy document for the coming decades. In this context, it would be more accurate to look for the projections of India’s future strategy in practice in the behaviour of the ruling class.
Close monitoring of how and in what way the US and some European entrepreneurs will benefit from the shift of their investments from China to countries such as India and Vietnam will at least give clues about the strategy that this country will adopt in technological breakthroughs.
In order to understand the course of developments in the Asia-Pacific region, it is important to closely scrutinise how India envisages balancing China, which has emerged as a global actor on the world stage right next to India, under current conditions and in the future.
Another issue worth mentioning when analysing India’s future is the domestic political balance. India, which has endeavoured to keep democracy alive in its region since its independence, has gradually shifted towards populism with the Modi administration. By prioritising Hindu nationalism, Modi’s rule has sought to suppress the voices of other segments and minorities of the heterogeneous Indian society.[17] the socio-economic picture of India during and after[18] Although it is not easy to predict where it will evolve, it can be said that this country has a good chance of moving towards a bright future if it maintains its current pace of development.
Turkey and India: Non-functioning/Broken Radars in Asia Re-opening
Beyond India’s 2030s[19] Based on the assumption that Turkey’s position in global politics will increase, it is important to examine the future of Turkey-India relations. Since 2010, Turkey has been aiming to improve its relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region in bilateral and multilateral frameworks. Ankara has been looking at Japan, South Korea, Australia and Australia as countries in the region,
It has managed to establish strategic relations with countries such as Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. Its relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh, two countries from the subcontinent, are based on historical ties of friendship. Relations with Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam, have also been enriched.
In a multilateral framework, Ankara signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and established a Sectoral Dialogue Partnership in 2017. In 2012, it was accepted as a Dialogue Partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
There is no doubt that the process initiated in 2010 laid a solid foundation for the “Re-Asia
Initiative” announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 2019. Various aspects of this Initiative were discussed at the “Asia-Pacific Workshop” held in Ankara in May 2021 with the participation of the Turkish academic world, a Final Declaration was published in the light of the papers presented at this event, and a series of goals were set for the advancement of the Initiative.[20] The extent to which these objectives have been met to date has not yet been shared with the public in a holistic framework. Therefore, it has not been possible to make empirical measurements in the absence of data on the implementation of the objectives.
It is noteworthy that the Asia-Pacific Workshop was limited to the presentation of two papers on India, one directly and the other indirectly. In the objectives included in the Final Declaration, there is no reference to India. In this respect, even if it is a forced inference, it is understood that India was evaluated under the criterion of “functional structuring” at the Workshop. It is noteworthy that India is not mentioned at all in the needs-based “win-win phenomenon”.
What should be done in Turkey-India Relations?
When we look at the scale of South Asia, it should be questioned whether the desired distance has been travelled in Turkey-India relations compared to the relations with other countries in the region. In this context, it is possible to characterise India as the missing link of Asia-Pacific in terms of Turkey’s relations with the region.
Relations with India, a country with one fifth of its population consisting of Muslim communities (which is approximately equivalent to the population of Indonesia), which received support not only from Indian Muslims but also from Hindu leaders and communities in our War of Independence, and which therefore played an important role in both our distant and recent
history, are largely under the mortgage of ties with Pakistan.
Trade volume between the two countries[21] According to 2022 data, it is $10.71 billion. The last high-level visit from Turkey to India was President Erdoğan’s visit to New Delhi in Spring 2017. Apart from the bilateral framework, the leaders of the two countries have been in contact on the occasion of the G20 Summits; however, these contacts have not met the targets announced during the official visit in 2017.[22][23] India, which almost excludes India. Therefore, there is a need for a new roadmap for diversifying and enriching Turkey-India relations, inspired by the “winwin” criterion of the “Asia Re-opening” initiative, which almost excludes India.
It is possible to summarise the elements that initially come to mind for inclusion in this road map as follows:
| – |
Indian Prime Minister Modi should be invited to Turkey for a return visit in 2024. |
| – |
On the occasion of this official visit, it should be ensured that the two countries sign agreements that will take economic-commercial-technological cooperation beyond diplomatic-cultural relations. |
| – |
Attempts should be made to organise a Turkey-India-Pakistan trilateral summit before or after the official visit and to ensure that the challenges in India-Pakistan bilateral relations are addressed with a constructive understanding for the future. Here, the “win-win” formula of the initiative designed for the Asia-Pacific region should be taken as a basis. |
| – |
Taking into account that the economies of Turkey and India have complementary characteristics, Turkey and India have a strong partnership in new and ground-breaking technologies, especially in Artificial Intelligence and space.22 co-operation should be initiated. Ways should be sought to utilise India’s know-how in 5G and quantum technologies on a mutually beneficial basis. |
| – |
Exploring the possibilities of cooperation between the two countries in the defence industry should be considered. |
| – |
The opportunities and facilities that the service, agriculture, health, logistics and connectivity sectors can offer to both countries should be identified. |
| – |
Proposals to link India to the Central Corridor should be developed and Pakistan should be encouraged to seek and open up to play a positive role in this context. |
| – |
As with many other countries in the region, a mechanism should be established to put consultation and co-operation with India on a regular and permanent basis. |
| – |
A framework should be established to increase contacts between the academic institutions and non-governmental civil society organisations of the two countries. |
| – |
A consensus should be reached to teach Turkish languages in India and Indian languages in Turkey. A similar approach should be developed for the discipline of history, aiming to update a similar consensus. |
What is the Future of Turkey-India Relations in the Current Global Competition?
The future of Turkey-India relations can be analysed based on a variety of factors, including Turkey’s complex relations with regional actors such as Pakistan and Russia, as well as its evolving attitude towards China and the United States.23 The main factors shaping Turkey-India relations can be summarised in the table below:
| Pakistan Factor: |
Turkey’s historic support to Pakistan, especially on the Kashmir issue, has led to tensions with India. |
| Commercial and Economic Interests: |
India is Turkey’s second largest trading partner in East Asia and has the potential for expanded co-operation between the two countries’ sectors. |
| Regional Dynamics: |
Turkey’s involvement in regional conflict management, such as in Syria, Libya and Karabakh, is a geopolitical balancing act, given the shared interest in stability and peace.24 The ongoing cooperation with India creates opportunities for co-operation with India. |
https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/india-and-turkiye-still-searching-for-a-breakthrough/
| Global Alliances: |
|
Turkey’s BRICS group[24] The interest in such initiatives points to its willingness to develop relations with multilateral structures alternative to the West. |
|
|
|
| Despite the challenges, there are opportunities for Turkey and India to co-operate in areas such as trade, technology and energy.
The potential areas for future cooperation between Turkey and India can be summarised in the table below: |
| Increasing Role of India in the Re-Asia Initiative |
India’s role in Turkey’s “Re-Asia” Initiative could include expanding economic and trade ties as well as addressing sensitive inter-regional issues. Thus, Turkey can expand its economic and trade ties with Asian partners to promote greater economic inclusion and regional cooperation. |
|
| Cyber Security |
India and Turkey can work together to improve cyber security measures and protect against cyber threats. |
|
| Construction |
Given India’s plan to build 50 million houses and Turkey’s expertise in the construction sector, both countries can cooperate in construction and infrastructure-superstructure projects. |
|
| Energy |
The partnership in the energy sector offers opportunities for joint ventures and investments, utilising India’s growing energy needs and Turkey’s capabilities in this field. For example, both countries are investing in renewable energy sources. Co-operation in projects related to solar, wind and hydroelectric energy to ensure energy security and sustainability |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
can increase energy access and reliability. Joint initiatives in energy infrastructure development, such as power plants and transmission networks, could benefit both countries by increasing energy access and reliability. |
| Energy Efficiency |
Sharing best practices and technologies for improving energy efficiency in industry and households can be mutually beneficial in reducing energy consumption and cost. |
| Research and Development |
Cooperation in research and development initiatives in energy technologies can stimulate innovation and create new opportunities for both countries in the global energy market. |
| Trade and Economic Relations: Some of the main goods traded between the two countries are listed below.
India to Turkey:[25] Petroleum
Products ($160 million) Iron and
Steel ($119 million)
Artificial yarn, fabrics (84 million dollars)
Auto components/parts ($75 million) Telecoms equipment ($68 million) Industrial machinery ($53 million) Turkey to India:
Gold ($227 million)
Vegetable oils ($220 million) |
Strengthening economic ties through initiatives such as the signing of a free trade agreement between the two countries could deepen mutual economic engagement and promote long-term co-operation. As of 2023, trade relations between Turkey and India will increase by approximately 13.81[26] billion, creating a strong foundation for deeper economic cooperation. The balance of trade is in India’s favour, with India’s imports higher than Turkey’s exports. To reduce the trade deficit, Turkey is encouraging Indian investors to participate in various sectors such as construction, energy and tourism. Despite some challenges, such as historical tensions with Pakistan and differences in strategic priorities, Turkey and India have been working to develop bilateral trade and mutually beneficial economic co-operation. |
| Granite, natural stones (186 million dollars) Electrical machinery and equipment ($179 million) Iron and steel ($170 million) Inorganic chemicals ($141 million) |
for the promotion of exists. |
one potential |
|
| Multilateral Participation |
Both countries can |
work together in |
|
multilateral forums to promote mutual economic growth on a broader scale. |
|
| In conclusion, it is in India’s interest as well as Turkey’s to overcome the current stagnation of relations with India, a candidate to become one of the main power centres of the global order in the future, and to add new content and richness to them in a wider area. At least the spirit of the “Asian Re-opening” necessitates that the relations between the two countries should be advanced in bilateral and multilateral frameworks with an eye to the future. |
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[2] Chakravorti, B. (2023). IsIndia the world’s next great economicpower ?
HarvardBusiness Review. https://hbr.org/2023/09/is-india-the-worlds-next-great-economic-power?
[3] Chaturvedi, M. (2023). National Technology Day: Seven tech trends that will shape India’s future. NDTV Profit. https://www.ndtvprofit.com/technology/national-technology-day-seven-tech-trends-that-will-shape- indias-future
[4] BBC News Turkish. (2023). India’s exploration vehicle takes “first steps” on the lunar surface a. BBC News
Turkish. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cv215evnejlo
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[7] Miller, M. C. (2023). What did Prime Minister Modi’s state visit achieve? Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-did-prime-minister-modis-state-visit-achieve
[8] Madhani, A., & Boak, J. (2023). Biden, Modi and G20 allies unveil rail and shipping project linking India to Middle East and Europe | AP News. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/biden-modi-infrastructure-g20- europe-middle-east-eb8988dfbd6c9c6f2c411c893d548333
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