The Middle East, alongside the ongoing civil war in Syria, has clearly demonstrated not only the state structures but also how identity politics has reshaped the region. At this point, it is evident that a new political movement advancing through nationalism is affecting not only the Arab world but also a broad geography stretching from Iran to the Eastern Mediterranean. It is difficult to say that this process developed spontaneously; on the contrary, it can be argued that global and regional actors, primarily the United States, consciously directed and even fuelled this wave.
In this context, Persian nationalism is a factor that is often overlooked but is extremely critical from a strategic perspective. It is no coincidence that Reza Pahlavi, heir to the Pahlavi dynasty, has recently gained increased international visibility, regularly featured in mainstream US media and garnered significant support within the Iranian diaspora. The fact that Pahlavi’s latest speech was watched by approximately 90 million people indicates that this option is no longer ‘on the dusty shelves of history’ in public opinion both inside and outside Iran. This line, openly supported by Israel and increasingly covertly by the US, suggests that a ‘second Pahlavi’ or similar model of governance, centred on Persian nationalism and compatible with the West, could be back on the table in Iran.
From the US-Israel perspective, a secular, Persian nationalist and Western-integrated Iranian regime is highly attractive, replacing the Shiite revolutionary ideology. If Azerbaijanis, who constitute approximately 25 per cent of Iran’s population, can be integrated into this model—provided they are represented in the government and have a place in the system—the goal could be a ‘controlled transformation’ rather than the division of Iran. In this case, from the perspective of the US and Israel, a political belt compatible with themselves would emerge, stretching from Azerbaijan through Iran to the Kurdish regions of Iraq and Syria. Such a structure would serve as a balancing force for both Arab and Turkish nationalism.
Saudi Arabia’s recent pursuit of tripartite and multilateral alliances is also not independent of this context. The United Arab Emirates’ positioning almost entirely within the British-US-Israeli axis is pushing Riyadh towards more flexible and multifaceted pursuits. The search for a new balance in the region is taking shape based on identities and interests rather than classical sectarian or bloc politics.
In this multi-layered picture, Turkey must act with extreme caution. The fragile structure in northern Iraq, the areas controlled by the PKK/YPG east of the Euphrates, and the growing expectations and appetite of the Kurdish separatist movements in Iran pose serious risks for Ankara. Therefore, Turkey’s fundamental principle must be clear: the defence of the territorial integrity of Iran, Iraq and Syria. This principle is not merely a normative statement, but also a strategic necessity for Turkey’s own national security.
However, this stance cannot be limited to a principle declared solely in foreign policy. Turkey must simultaneously establish Turkish-Kurdish relations on a permanent and positive footing within its own borders. A Turkey that cannot consolidate its internal peace will have a weak claim to defending regional stability. Similarly, it is vitally important for Ankara to establish forward-looking, inclusive and sustainable relations with all peoples in Iraq, Syria and Iran, primarily Turks, Kurds, Arabs and Persians.
At the regional level, new cooperation frameworks are needed to enhance Turkey’s balancing capacity. Structures such as the Saudi Arabia–Pakistan–Turkey triangle should be supported by broader regional cooperation, including Egypt if necessary. Such platforms can limit the moves of the US–Israel axis in the region not through direct opposition, but through balance and the creation of alternatives.
In this process, Turkey’s fundamental approach in its relations with both the US and Russia should be dialogue and diplomacy, not conflict. Ankara should send a clear message to both actors: ‘Stability in this region can be achieved not through other actors, but together with Turkey.’ Turkey’s geopolitical position, military capacity, diplomatic networks and regional legitimacy make it an indispensable balancing factor.
In any case, Turkey should neither overestimate nor underestimate its power in this equation with many unknowns. Strategic thinking, measured use of power, and a long-term perspective are of vital importance. It is therefore essential to accelerate the decisive steps taken in the defence industry. In the foreseeable future, ‘hard politics’ will continue to be decisive in the geography in which Turkey finds itself. The greatest test facing Turkey is not to escape this reality, but to read and manage it correctly.
