Mustafa Ergün Olgun,
Betrayal — The Other Side of the Cyprus Case: An Account of the Cyprus Issue and the UN Facilitated Settlement Process from 1960 to 2025
Pelgrave Macmillan, 649 pages, 2025
As someone involved in the UN-led settlement process in Cyprus as a negotiator for many years, M. Ergün Olgun explains in his book his own experience on what he believes is needed for the establishment and sustainability of a multinational federal partnership, as well as his assessment on why it failed.
For in-depth reading, Olgun’s book, aside from the issue of federation, includes also his personal eye-witnessing and assessments on a wide range of other critical topics of the Cyprus conflict, such as the disputed UN intervention, the illegitimate EU membership of Greek Cypriot Administration despite the 1960 accords, partiality of UNFICYP (UN Force in Cyprus) and details of several tours of unsuccessful negotiations. It also sheds light for those interested on the issues of conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peace-making, mediation, de facto states and recognition with contributions from academicians. Additionally, the book in general serves as a rich reference document for historians, politicians and diplomats on what has happened in Cyprus for the last 70 or more years.
Olgun feels obliged, given the book’s scope, to add “With all due humility, I can claim a unique and intimate knowledge of the issue.”
Since federalism is currently a controversial matter and widely discussed, the chapter on federation especially deserves attention. On this burning issue, Olgun starts his evaluation by quoting Prof. Ronald L. Watts who defines federations as a broad category of political systems in which, by contrast to the single central source of authority in unitary systems, there are two (or more) levels of government; these combine elements of shared-rule through common institutions and regional self-rule for the governments of constituent units.
He points out that multinational/multiethnic federations aim at uniting societies that differ significantly in ancestry, language and culture (such as Belgium, Switzerland and Canada) in order to reap the advantages of a common political unit behind joint interests. They are born out of necessity and are carried out on a voluntary basis by their equal founders. Such federations are divided according to powers. Federal states are also divided according to a distinction based on territorial and community principles. This is why an equally-based bi-zonal and bi-communal federation was envisaged for Cyprus between 1977 and 2017 , but never materialized.
As for the success and sustainability conditions of federations, Olgun cites six main pillars:
National recognition, Linguistic rights, Integration powers, Fiscal autonomy, Internal self-determination (possession of a veto right) and External self-determination (right to secede).
In light of the foregoing definitions and through comparisons with examples from outside, Olgun turns his focus to the following realities of the island in order to judge whether a genuine partnership could be founded:
-The Greek Cypriots still continue to behave as if they were the sole and privileged masters of Cyprus,
-They and the UN, through outdated Security Council resolutions (mainly the 186 of 1964) still try to impose their quasi-federation on the Turkish Cypriot people despite the failed partnership experience of 1960 and the long years of failed federation talks,
-Turkish Cypriots have been deprived of their equal inherent rights while under repressive, inhuman embargoes.
-Greek Cypriots and Greece carried out two coups in Cyprus; the first in December 1963 and the second on 15 July 1974. Both were with the sole aim of taking total control of the island.
He reminds furthermore that, despite the attempts of seven UN Secretaries General, dozens of special representatives and advisers, from 1964 to the present, the goal of a new partnership has not been achieved, which subsequently makes it necessary to question the usefulness of the Cyprus negotiation process and objectives.
Another important point in this context raised by Olgun in his book is the repeated emphasis that federalism scholars put on the danger of imposing a federal solution on parties involved in intractable ethnic conflict. Dan Lindley, Associate Professor at the University of Notre Dame argues that in Cyprus, a premature solution would cause gridlock in the federal government and exacerbate intercommunal strife. Outside observers also draw attention to the fact that the Greek Orthodox Church had from the start been against federalism and had branded it as “destruction of Hellenism in the island”.
Olgun in his book also brings forward a significant factor he witnessed throughout all phases of the UN-led negotiation process: what the Greek Cypriots wanted under the guise of a “federal settlement” was the devolution of some powers to a Turkish Cypriot province through changes to the constitution of their commandeered “Republic of Cyprus”. They would dominate that province and in time turn the island into a Hellenic nation state. This would also amount to the legitimization of their 1963 political coup.
Olgun believes that a true federation is not made but grown. He adds though that his own experience shows that the great majority of Greek Cypriots see Turkish Cypriots as an obstacle standing between them and their ultimate goals. Evidently, he notes, there is in the island a lack of mutual respect and empathy, as well as a deep crisis of confidence and a lack a culture of cooperation. He says he has been involved in many talks and witnessed time and again Greek Cypriots characterizing the island of Cyprus as a bastion of Christianity, with particular reference to the Crusades, and portraying the Turkish Cypriots, and Turks in general, as the “other”. He thinks that there is no shared understanding of what federation in principle means and that neither side embraces federation as its preferred best option.
Olgun writes, “After 11 years of determined effort with President Rauf Denktaş and, following this, similar effort, particularly with Presidents Derviş Eroğlu and Ersin Tatar, it is clear to me, and should be clear to all, that the Greek Cypriot side’s objective in talks is not and has not been the establishment of a genuine equality-based bi-ethnic/bi-communal federation, but only the continuity of their illegitimate state with Turkish Cypriots patched into it.” He adds that when the Greek Cypriot leaders talk about resolution and a federal settlement, what they have in mind is the integration of the Turkish Cypriots into their 100 % Greek Cypriot state usurped in 1963 by force of arms.
As one of his noteworthy observations during the negotiations, he mentions the disappointment and feelings of betrayal of those Turkish Cypriots who gave one-sided concessions to the other side and returned empty-handed.
In this context, Olgun quotes the comments of the former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw from an article at UK’s “Independent” on 1 October 2017 following the Crans-Montana failure: “The solution is to partition the island and give international recognition to the Turkish-Cypriot state… In one of its worst strategic decisions ever, the European Union… agreed that Cyprus should join the EU… whether agreement had been reached… or not… The status quo for the South is simply too comfortable.”
Olgun’s book, an honest breakdown of a lifelong observation and first hand involvement, is full of evidences showing that a true partnership in Cyprus is hard to attain.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the only option of the Turkish Cypriots remains to strengthen their own state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and demand from the international community their well deserved rights of sovereign equality and equal international status with the Greek Cypriots.
