FROM AUTHORS
Selin Nasi

Windsor Protocol

11 March 2023
PAYLAŞ

Seeking a middle ground in post-Brexit UK-EU relations: Windsor Framework Agreement

In recent weeks, when Turkey’s agenda was focused on humanitarian relief efforts after the earthquake on the one hand and the political earthquake that shook the opposition bloc on the other, an important development took place between the United Kingdom and the European Union (EU). As a result of an intensive negotiation process, the parties announced that they agreed to revise the Northern Ireland Protocol, which caused problems in post-Brexit relations. The Windsor Framework Agreement, as the new Windsor Framework Agreement is now known, is a critical compromise step that – if it receives sufficient support in domestic politics – will secure peace and stability in Northern Ireland and pave the way for the UK to conduct its relations with both the EU and the US on a more moderate level.

The Northern Ireland Protocol and the controversial customs border issue

The Northern Ireland Protocol regulates trade relations between Northern Ireland as part of the post-Brexit United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland as a member of the EU. In order not to contradict the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, the parties agreed that Northern Ireland would be subject to EU customs rules when the UK leaves the EU. Thus, a physical border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland was avoided.

However, Brexit made it necessary for a customs border to be established at some point. The rhetoric of then Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who negotiated the trade deal, was not enough to hide this fact. In the end, the parties agreed that customs checks would be carried out over the Irish Sea. However, as the disadvantageous conditions caused by the decision to leave the customs union started to make themselves felt on the ground, the Johnson government, citing Article 16 of the Additional Protocol to the Brexit Agreement, demanded that the protocol be revised to exclude inspections on UK exports to Northern Ireland. In June last year, a bill was even submitted to the House of Commons for the UK to unilaterally withdraw from the protocol.

This unilateral withdrawal, which casts a shadow over the UK’s credibility in the international arena, has led to strained relations with the EU and a decline in co-operation in many areas. The discomfort caused by the Protocol also locked the politics of Northern Ireland. Following Sinn Feinn’s victory in the elections held in May 2022, the pro-union Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) boycotted the election result, citing the Northern Ireland Protocol, and the government could not be formed. In the face of the political instability that affected Northern Ireland, the concern of the Irish-origin US President Joe Biden for the future of peace had a negative impact on the relations between the US and the UK.

Sunak effect on the deal:

The election of former Chancellor of the Exchequer Rishi Sunak as prime minister last October, following a stormy leadership election process within the Conservative Party, created a window of opportunity to resolve the current problems in relations with the EU. Compared to his predecessors Boris Johnson and Liz Truss, Sunak’s prudent and conciliatory stance was welcomed by Brussels and supported by Washington, which favours close cooperation among its allies. Contacts between leaders at high-level meetings allowed for the repair of eroded trust.

In this context, it is fair to say that the foundations of the Windsor Agreement were laid during the Sunak-Biden meeting at the G-20 Leaders’ Summit in Bali in November last year. Mr Sunak pledged to resolve the issues concerning the Northern Ireland Protocol, which had a negative impact on relations with the EU and jeopardised the future of the Good Friday Agreement, by the 25th anniversary of the agreement (next April). The fact that the free trade agreement, for which the UK has been waiting for a green light from Washington for quite some time, was included in the lines of the Biden-Sunak meeting suggests that the issue is linked to the resolution of the Northern Ireland Protocol issue.

What does the Windsor Agreement promise?

Compared to its predecessor, the Windsor Agreement offers an interim solution that will ensure the smooth flow of trade on the one hand, and on the other hand, it will partially allay sensitivities on issues such as sovereignty and the integrity of the union. Accordingly, it is planned to create a green lane for goods to be exported from the UK to Northern Ireland and a red lane for goods to be transported to the EU.

Goods travelling from the UK to Northern Ireland and staying there would not be subject to customs duties. In this way, trade, which has been slowed down by the preparation of documents and customs procedures, will accelerate again. The sale of delicatessen products (the famous sausage wars) and cheeses, which were banned under the old protocol, will be authorised. Cargo between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland will also be exempt from customs. UK-approved medicines – even if not approved by the European Medicines Agency – will be available for sale in Northern Ireland. The document requirement, which makes it difficult for pets to travel, will also be eliminated.

The old protocol’s reference to the European Court of Justice for the settlement of trade disputes offended those who were sensitive to sovereignty rights. The new agreement envisages the establishment of an arbitral tribunal with judges representing Northern Ireland, the UK and the EU. The protocol also gives the Northern Irish parliament, Stormont, the right to veto EU regulations. Given the 1998 Good Friday Agreement’s division of political authority between nationalists and pro-unionists in Northern Ireland, the new protocol leaves the door open for the UK to indirectly regulate its trade relations with the EU.

What are the reactions to the agreement?

Although the agreement is not recognised as an international treaty, BB Sunak intends to put the decision to a parliamentary vote. In this case, the position of his MPs, the opposition and of course the DUP will be decisive.

Labour Party leader Keir Starmer, who seems to be ahead of Sunak in the polls, is positive about the Windsor Agreement for now in terms of reducing tensions between the UK and the EU. The situation within the Conservative Party is a bit complicated. There are concerns that Johnson, who is looking for an opportunity to take back the Prime Minister’s seat, will favour the Brexiteers within the party. Stating that it is not possible for him to vote in favour of the deal if it is submitted to the Parliament for approval, Johnson also acknowledges that the public opinion is in favour of ending the conflict between the UK and the EU. The European Research Group (ERG), which represents the dark pro-Brexit vein within the Conservative Party, announced that they will act according to the decision of the DUP, the pro-union party of Northern Ireland. Although it will ease customs control in trade with Northern Ireland, it cannot be said that the agreement does not fully meet the expectations of the DUP in terms of the existence of a physical customs border and the EU’s partial preservation of its legal authority. However, after analysing the small print in the agreement, it is possible that those who want to see the bigger picture will weigh in and common sense will prevail.

The support for this protocol will be a diplomatic success for BB Sunak, who is struggling to manage the cost of living crisis. A détente process that encourages constructive dialogue between the UK and the EU will allow a revival of cooperation not only in trade but also in many other areas, from preventing illegal immigration to sharing R&D in science and technology. The EU’s announcement immediately after the signing of the Windsor Agreement that it would reactivate the UK’s membership of the Horizon 2020 scientific research programme is a goodwill gesture in this respect.

The softening of relations between London and Brussels is also a welcome development for Washington, which is trying to avoid a potential rift among its allies as the war in Ukraine continues. While the repercussions of the deal continue, US senators’ statements in Congress that it is time to negotiate a free trade agreement with the UK may be interpreted as a sign that concrete steps can be taken during President Biden’s planned visit to the UK in April.

It is actually quite tragic that the diplomatic effort to minimise the damage caused by the Brexit decision is being presented as a success story. The gap between the promises of the Brexiteers and the reality on the ground is widening every day. The fact that Mr Sunak will meet with French President Emmanuel Macron at the Elysée Palace to discuss controlling illegal migration is proof of how decisive it is for the UK’s interests to keep its relations with the EU close and warm.

 

YAZAR

Selin Nasi

Columnist & foreign policy commentator. Selin Nasi is a contributor to Karar Newspaper. She is also one of the regular foreign policy commentators to Femfikir-an all-female TV debate- broadcasted weekly on Medyascope TV, an independent media outlet. Formerly, she worked as a columnist at Hürriyet Daily News (2015-2018) and Şalom (2013-2018), the weekly newspaper of Turkey’s Jewish community.

Ms. Nasi received her BA from Marmara University’s Department of Political Science in 2000 and her MA from Istanbul Bilgi University in 2006, with her thesis “Turkey-American Relations Under the Shadow of the March 1 Resolution.”

Nasi received her PhD in Political Science and International Relations from Boğaziçi University in 2021. Her doctoral dissertation, “Turkey’s Israel Policy in the Post-Cold War: The Struggle of Identity over Realpolitik”analyzes the ups and downs of Turkish-Israeli ties in relation to the transformation of the international system,along with structural changes in Turkish politics.

Her most recent publication is a book chapter she co-authored with Soli Özel titled “How the Syrian War shifted the balance of power in Turkish-Israeli relations,” in Israeli-Turkish Relations in Comparative Perspective,edited by Ayşegül Sever and Orna Almog. London:Palgrave MacMillan, 2019.

Tüm Yazıları

İlgili Yazılar

WILL BIDEN USE THE “G” WORD?

22 April 2021

President Biden will issue his first Armenian Remembrance Day statement this Saturday — his 95th in office and his 95th abstaining from calling Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Biden’s off-the-cuff character stands in contrast to previous administrations, presenting an unprecedented possibility that he could indeed use the “G” word to define what happened to Armenians in 1915 in the last throes of the Ottoman Empire.

 

At the same time, an intense debate is taking place from Washington to London to Brussels to Moscow and beyond about very old questions in a very new political world. The pandemic has not changed the essence of this debate and the questions somehow all intersect here in Turkey. If the U.S. is gradually divorcing from the Middle East and shifting its weight to Asia, is it also time to politically divorce from Turkey? If Turkey’s reaction to the “G” word does not count any longer, does the calculation promise an obedient Ankara continuing its cooperation in the Caucasus and the Middle East, or has Turkey’s presence in all these areas gone awry in deed and word?

 

Turkish elections will ultimately break free of their political stagnation, but the opposition parties’ performance keeps kicking that action further down the road. But in the context of the Armenian Remembrance Day statement, Biden’s White House must ultimately consider whether Turkey is still a vitally important ally.

 

President Biden has announced he will withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan, and those talks would have begun in Istanbul on April 24 – if it were not to be postponed on Tuesday to after the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Whether the Taliban will ever attend the meetings or stay put until the last U.S. troop departs Afghanistan remains to be seen. While Turkey’s role in shaping these developments is limited, Washington called upon its government to play this role. At stake, however, is Washington’s approach to the new political world in terms of its defense alliances and prospects to contain China and Russia, stability in the Middle East, stability in the Caucasus with potential armed conflict in Ukraine, the future of the Iranian nuclear program, and Israel’s security dilemmas despite the Abraham Accords. Add to this mix Turkey itself, which has nearly 85 million people, hosts almost 4 million Syrian refugees, and is economically weak and increasingly at unease with itself.

 

While some may debate whether Turkey has lost some of its importance on the world stage, the U.S. is better off with Turkey as an ally in its defense, security, diplomatic and economic endeavors. Pushing Turkey away from NATO will surely have a cost. If the Biden administration wants to keep Turkey aligned with the West, it has no option but to pass on using the “G” word. And let’s be clear: the debate over what happened between the Ottoman Empire’s government and its citizens of Armenian origin in 1915 has long ceased to be about honoring the dead. It has become a political tool to push the government in Ankara to behave in a particular way. The U.S. opposes Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles supposedly because it will threaten NATO military operations. But the U.S. also continues to keep pressure on its ally to avoid losing Turkey to Russian influence.

 

Western governments and planners may reckon with how they misread Turkey’s importance once, and may still do it again. Turkey’s current vulnerabilities and weaknesses did not emerge all at once but over time — but once things start to go south, the damage is done. How does the Biden White House define the state of today’s Turkish state? Can the Biden administration afford to burn bridges with the Turkish public by using the “G” word?

 

President Biden’s first Armenian Remembrance Day statement will have a direct impact on Turkey – either breaking a bond or finding a way to connect with ordinary citizens. If he passes on using the “G” word, he would boldly convey his disapproval of Erdogan’s politics without opposing the Turkish people. That could open new opportunities during this time of so many pressing security dilemmas in and around Turkey. If he decides differently, though, the Turkish public could see it as yet another example of American two-facedness. The already existing distrust to U.S. intentions and politics will get easily quadrupled. And that certainly would make a statement on the shaping of the new world politics.

TÜRKİYE BULLSHIT FROM THE EU SUMMIT

27 May 2024

A belated article, but “never too late” when it comes to the EU ……..

The great, mostly fabricated, leaders of the EU members and institutions met last April in a Council format and took some big decisions. The summit document included a section on Turkey. In the past, EU decisions and texts on Turkey used to attract public attention and be discussed for days. Since there has been no progress in our relations with the EU, that interest has disappeared. Even I, although I have been involved with the EU for years, did not look at the latest Summit decisions. I was contented with reading the articles of a few of our expert friends. It seems that there is nothing new for us under the EU sun.

It was clear in 2004 and 2005 that we would reach these days. When I left my EU post in Brussels, I told my press colleagues who asked my opinion on the future of Turkey-EU relations, “First scan, then don’t call me.” The right was rising in Europe, and it was clear that they would use the Greek / Greek Cypriot excuses to trip us up at the first opportunity. On our side, those who had internalized the EU business were very narrow. I knew many politicians, many military and civilian bureaucrats who claimed that if we entered the EU we would suffer a moral collapse, or that we would be divided, or that we would have to make vital concessions in the Aegean and Cyprus. At the end of 2006, the Sarkozy/Merkel duo tripped us by using the Customs Union and some aspects of the Cyprus problem as an excuse. However, they could have solved this problem, which they defined as a trade dispute related to the Customs Union, by taking it to the World Trade Organization. They forgot that it was the Greek Cypriots who said no to the Kofi Annan plan.

There was no question of Ankara compromising on Cyprus. “Even if the progress of our EU process is blocked for political reasons, we will continue our efforts to harmonize with EU standards. Because these standards are necessary for us.” This position was adopted at the verbal level. However, the need for progress, especially in the areas of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, has not been internalized by the ruling party, which is why the harmonization process with EU standards has been hampered. Within a few years, the well-known process of regression in these areas began. Turkey-EU relations also deteriorated. So much so that our status as a candidate country is not even emphasized in the documents. We are considered as a refugee warehouse. We are seen as a neighbor with whom good relations can be established if we accept Greek / Greek Cypriot demands.

If you ask EU members, “why are we like this?”, you will get the answer “Well, you don’t fulfill the criteria!”. It is true that our rulers have no intention of adopting the EU criteria, but this is not the case. I will never forget the words of a famous French right-wing politician: “You can fulfill the EU criteria. But even if you fulfill all the criteria, we will not make you a member. Because the EU means France and Germany. If Turkey enters, it will become the third power. We don’t want that.” This is the situation.

The coming to power of a political movement that has internalized democracy in Turkey is not in the interest of this reactionary understanding that dominates the EU. Because such a movement would meet the EU criteria and the other side would be left with only Greek / Greek Cypriot demands as a card to use against Turkey. Everyone in the EU knows well that the foundations of those demands are weak. It is impossible for the EU side to win the debate on those demands against our real diplomats. However, it will take a multi-dimensional diplomatic campaign to create the conditions for the EU to turn to the Greek / Greek Cypriot duo and say “enough is enough”.

So what are we going to do with the EU? We are not going to try to ingratiate ourselves with them. We will strengthen human rights, democracy and the rule of law for ourselves. Moreover, the EU and some of its members are failing badly in these areas because of the Gaza conflict. They are not only double standardizing but also hypocritical. We need to be strong enough to defend EU values against the current EU.

On the other hand, if the Commission has still not sent us the screening report of the chapter on free movement of workers, I do not think it is realistic to expect progress on visa exemption at this stage, no matter what we do.

Updating the customs union is of course a good thing and a necessity, but starting negotiations without securing the Cyprus aspect of this issue will lead to us being backed into a corner at the end of the process. Unless the EU reverses its decision against us at the end of 2006, it seems difficult to improve our relations. However, there is nothing preventing us from continuing our efforts to harmonize with EU standards. There is no need to seek a new status for EU-Turkey relations. Let’s keep the candidate status. If we negotiate another model of relations, we may be at a disadvantage.

This is how relations are likely to continue under the AKP. The EU has no complaints about this course of events that keeps Turkey at arm’s length. Hopefully, a Turkey with a democratic and economic development under a new government through early elections will help the EU to come to its senses. The EU and Turkey’s need for each other is strategic. We can see this more easily, but the EU has a difficult job as it becomes more right-wing… Nevertheless, the day will come…

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

@2024 – Ankara Politikalar Merkezi

Yayın Politikamız:
Ankara Politikalar Merkezi üyelerinin veya web sayfamızda yazıları çıkan APM üyesi olmayan kişilerin, APM web sayfasında yayınlanan yazılarında veya APM üyelerinin diğer mecralarda açıkladıkları görüşleri şahsi görüşleri olup Ankara Politikalar Merkezini bağlamaz. APM adına, yalnızca Yönetim Kurulu veya Yönetim Kurulu tarafından yetkilendirilmiş Yönetim Kurulu üyeleri açıklama yapabilir, APM’yi bağlayan açıklama veya görüşleri ifade edebilir.