A Fact Charlie Hebdo Neglected: The French Once Really Sent Tanks to the Territory

For millions of Turkish citizens today, obtaining a visa to visit, study, or work in developed countries has become an exhausting, humiliating, and often fruitless process. Whether it is the United States, European Union members, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, China, or even Russia, securing a visa has turned into an obstacle course — one that many Turks feel is stacked unfairly against them.

The reasons cited by these countries are often wrapped in polite diplomatic language. They range from “security concerns” to “migration risk” and “overstaying potential.” Some claim their consular systems are overloaded, or that high demand justifies longer waiting periods. Others insist that Turkey’s economic situation or political environment makes it necessary to “scrutinize applications more carefully.” Whatever the explanation, the outcome is the same: long queues, months-long delays, costly applications, and a high rate of rejection.

In the case of many EU member states, the visa issue has also become a subtle political snub directed at Türkiye’s current government — a way of signaling disapproval without formal diplomatic confrontation. While such gestures may play well in domestic European politics, they punish ordinary Turkish citizens rather than policymakers.

At the same time, it is true that Turkish citizens are among the top nationalities applying for asylum in EU countries. This reality does create a degree of understandable caution among European consular officers. Yet, any reasonable and properly trained visa officer should be capable of distinguishing between potential asylum seekers and genuine short-term travelers — businesspeople, students, academics, artists, and others who have clear ties and intentions to return. This distinction is not difficult to make, and it should not become an obstacle for the tens of thousands of eligible applicants who pose no migration risk whatsoever.

Turkish citizens from every walk of life have voiced their frustration. Businesspeople complain that they are unable to attend fairs, meetings, or investment summits — even when they can show proof of funds, return tickets, and established careers. Students with scholarships to top universities abroad are denied visas without explanation. Academics invited to conferences face uncertainty and humiliation at consulates. Sportsmen and women miss tournaments. Artists and journalists, whose work depends on cultural exchange, are rejected or made to wait endlessly. Even holders of green (official) passports — who represent the Turkish state in some capacity — are increasingly subject to scrutiny and arbitrary refusal.

The consequences go far beyond individual inconvenience. When Turkish entrepreneurs cannot travel freely, trade opportunities are lost. Partnerships go unrealized. Academic and scientific collaboration suffers, and the next generation of students is deprived of global exposure. Tourism, ironically, is affected too — not because Turks do not wish to travel, but because they often cannot. For many, the right to mobility — a basic feature of modern citizenship — feels like a privilege reserved for others.

Contrast this with Türkiye’s own visa regime. Ankara has long adopted one of the most liberal policies in the world, particularly toward citizens of developed nations. Most European countries, along with the United States, Japan, South Korea, and others, can enter Türkiye without a visa. Some — such as citizens of Germany and Poland — can even do so using only their national ID cards. The rationale is simple: to encourage tourism, attract foreign currency, and maintain the flow of visitors who contribute to the economy. Tourism represents a crucial source of hard currency for Türkiye, and in a time of economic pressure, the logic of “open doors” seems financially sound.

But there are other reasons as well. Türkiye has always seen itself as a crossroads between East and West — hospitable, open, and pragmatic. Maintaining easy access for foreigners reinforces its image as a welcoming destination and supports its geopolitical ambitions to remain a bridge between regions. It also serves a strategic economic goal: to make Istanbul a major global travel hub and to strengthen Turkish Airlines as a leading international carrier — a policy that has clearly paid off.

Still, one cannot ignore the growing sense of unfairness. Countries with similar or even weaker economies than Türkiye — from Latin America to parts of Eastern Europe — often enjoy visa-free travel to the Schengen zone or the UK. Meanwhile, Turks, who live in one of the world’s top twenty economies, are treated as potential overstayers or security risks. The contrast is both insulting and counterproductive.

Would reciprocity help? Should Türkiye begin to apply similar restrictions to those countries that make life so difficult for Turkish citizens? In theory, reciprocity is a matter of dignity and equality between states. If one side imposes strict visa controls, the other is entitled to do the same. In practice, however, this approach has costs. Fewer tourists would come. Hotels, restaurants, and shops across Türkiye — especially in resort regions — could lose valuable income. Jobs would be affected, and the flow of foreign currency would shrink at a time when the country needs it most.

Yet the argument is not purely economic. National pride and sovereignty matter too. A country that welcomes millions of visitors without question, while its own citizens are made to beg for entry elsewhere, cannot avoid the question: how long can this imbalance continue? A more measured approach may be necessary — one that does not close Türkiye’s doors but introduces reciprocity selectively, beginning with states that show consistent bad faith or systemic discrimination.

In the short term, Türkiye will likely continue to prioritize tourism revenues and economic stability. But over the medium term, the country must start asserting its dignity and protecting its citizens’ rights through a more balanced visa policy. This could mean requiring visas for certain countries, introducing digital pre-clearance systems, or linking future relaxations to genuine reciprocity.

A nation’s openness should never be mistaken for weakness. Türkiye’s hospitality has deep roots — but fairness must be mutual. It is time to remind the world that respect, like access, should go both ways.

Introduction: The Rediscovery of Central Asia

The statement made by the President of the European Commission at the EU–Central Asia Samarkand Summit in 2025—“Central Asia was once the middle of nowhere; today it is the center of everything”—is not merely diplomatic rhetoric but a concise reflection of a structural transformation in global power balances. Long regarded as Russia’s “backyard,” Central Asia has today become one of the pivotal regions of the global system in terms of energy security, critical raw materials, transport and trade corridors, and geopolitical competition.

This transformation should be understood not as an abrupt rupture, but within a framework of historical continuity. Central Asia has been a theater of great-power rivalry since the nineteenth century; however, in the twenty-first century this competition has evolved into a more complex, multi-actor contest employing diverse and layered instruments of influence.

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I. The Historical Background of the Great Game

The expansionist policy of Tsarist Russia toward Central Asia acquired a systematic character from the mid-eighteenth century onward. The process of establishing military and administrative control over the Kazakh steppes began in the 1730s and accelerated between 1840 and 1860. Russia consolidated its dominance in Western Turkestan by capturing Tashkent in 1865, bringing the Emirate of Bukhara under control in 1868, subjugating the Khanate of Khiva in 1873, and abolishing the Khanate of Kokand in 1876.

This expansion triggered not only a regional but a global power struggle. Russia’s southward drive toward warm waters and India directly conflicted with the interests of the British Empire in the Indian subcontinent, while China (under the Qing dynasty) sought to preserve its control over Eastern Turkestan. This multi-actor rivalry came to be known in the literature as the “Great Game.”

Following the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia maintained its presence in Central Asia under the framework of the Soviet Union, while China, after 1949, retained control over Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang) as the People’s Republic of China. Outer Mongolia (present-day Mongolia) functioned as a buffer zone between the two powers.

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II. The Cold War and Its Aftermath: Central Asia’s Long Silence

Throughout the Cold War, despite periodic crises in Sino-Soviet relations, the People’s Republic of China did not assert an explicit claim to political influence in Central Asia. The primary reasons for this restraint were Beijing’s desire to avoid direct confrontation with the USSR and its concern over maintaining fragile ethnic and demographic balances in Xinjiang. China consistently viewed the potential influence of newly independent Turkic states on the Uyghur population as a security risk.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ushered in a new geopolitical era for Central Asia. The independence of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan opened a new sphere of engagement for the United States and the broader Western world. During this period, Western access to the region was largely mediated through Turkey. Turkey’s NATO membership, secular state structure, and ethno-linguistic affinity with Central Asian societies were decisive factors, alongside Western concerns about limiting Iran’s influence in the region.

Contrary to initial expectations, however, Western influence in Central Asia remained limited. Authoritarian political systems, deep economic and security dependence on Russia, the orientation of transport and energy infrastructure toward the north, and the region’s geographic distance from Western centers all constrained Western engagement. Western universities, media outlets, and civil society networks failed to achieve the depth of penetration seen in Eastern Europe. As a result, until 2022, Central Asia largely remained within Russia’s sphere of influence.

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III. U.S. and Chinese Initiatives: Failures and Enduring Strategies

In the mid-2000s, the United States advanced the “Greater Central Asia” concept, aiming to connect Central Asia with South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Various iterations of this approach, discussed in 2005 and 2010, failed due to instability in Afghanistan, insufficient financial backing, and the absence of sustained political commitment in Washington.

By contrast, China unveiled its comprehensive strategy—now known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—in 2013 in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. Central Asia occupied a central position in the BRI’s overland corridors. China presented the initiative primarily as an economic development project and sought to reassure Russia that it did not entail political domination. Russia, lacking the economic capacity to counterbalance China, refrained from open opposition and instead attempted to slow the process through cultural influence and media narratives.

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IV. The Post-2022 Rupture: The New Great Game

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 constituted a historical turning point for Central Asia. Initially, the region was marked by profound anxiety; if Russia was willing to intervene militarily in a country on Europe’s periphery, it was assumed that Central Asia—farther from Western political engagement—could be next. However, the protracted nature of the war and its transformation into a war of attrition severely undermined the myth of Russian military invincibility  prevailing in the region.

This shift pushed Central Asian states toward strategic diversification. The European Union, seeking to reduce its dependence on Russian energy, turned its attention to the region’s hydrocarbon resources and critical minerals. The United States revitalized the C5+1framework, elevating engagement with Central Asia to the level of heads of state.

For China, this period marked the reduction of geopolitical obstacles to the BRI. Beijing found a more permissive environment in which to relocate production to inland regions, secure overland trade routes, and accelerate demographic and economic transformation in Xinjiang.

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V. Regional and Middle-Power Actors

Since 1992, Turkey has pursued a strategy of institutional presence in Central Asia. The Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States, established in 2009, evolved into the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in 2021, expanding its scope and membership. The cultural affinity as well as Middle Corridor, along with transport and energy connectivity projects, constitutes Turkey’s principal strategic instruments in the region.

During the same period, Iran and the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE), as well as Japan and South Korea, significantly increased their diplomatic and economic engagement with Central Asia. Japan and South Korea have been particularly active in infrastructure development, technology transfer, and education.

The European Union, for its part, has allocated €13 billion under the Global Gateway strategy to connectivity projects linking the Caucasus and Central Asia.

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VI. The Central Asia Friendship Initiative: A Proposal

This overall picture indicates that a new Great Game is unfolding in Central Asia. Unlike its historical predecessor, however, this competition involves not only great powers but also middle powers with substantial economic and diplomatic capabilities. In this context, the launch of a “Central Asia Friendship Initiative” by Turkey, Japan and South Korea—potentially joined at later stages by the Gulf states—emerges as a strategically viable option.

Such an initiative could advance through:

•cultural cooperation,

•language and higher education programs,

•joint infrastructure projects and investment funds,

•business networks,

•technology and green transition initiatives.

Even if opportunities arise in the future to integrate with U.S. or EU-led initiatives, this framework would enhance the collective bargaining power of participating states and enable them to defend their interests more effectively.

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Conclusion

Central Asia has once again moved to the center of global politics in the twenty-first century. In this evolving environment, not only great powers but also middle powers acting on the basis of shared interests and complementary strengths can pursue constructive, sustainable, and balanced engagement. The Central Asia Friendship Initiative holds the potential to offer an alternative model of cooperation within the framework of the new Great Game.